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OVERWORK ROBS WORKERS’ HEALTH:
INTERPRETING OSHA’S GENERAL DUTY
CLAUSE TO PROHIBIT LONG WORK HOURS
Tosh Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, worker productivity in the United States
has tripled.1 This maximization of productivity has been the result
of the reorganization of work. The reorganization is characterized
by long work hours and a dizzying array of new work arrangements
that American capital, with the support of governmental policy and
the judiciary, has utilized to demand ever-increasing productivity
levels and squeeze more profit out of working people. These profit
margins are obscured by a so-called “work-and-spend” economy
that is characterized by long working hours, high-income growth,
and high consumption.2 For those workers marginalized by this
work-and-spend economy, long hours have become increasingly
necessary to supplement declining real wages and living standards.3
Now, long working hours are being linked to work-related injuries
and illnesses, including stress, depression, fatigue, performance-im-
paired and overexertion injuries, repetitive motion and cardiovas-
cular disorders, family conflict, and death.4 The demand for longer
* J.D., City University of New York School of Law, 2003; M.A., Georgia State Uni-
versity, 1996; B.A. University of Georgia, 1993. Recipient of the 2002-2003 Law School
Student Award sponsored by the Labor and Employment Law Section of the New
York State Bar Association. I would like to thank the following individuals for their
thoughtful comments, critiques, insights, suggestions, and guidance: Laura Gillis,
JoAnn Lum, Shirley Lung, Paul O’Neil, Kevin Read, and John Whitlow. I am particu-
larly thankful for the support of family and friends who have enriched and shaped
this journey, and, in particular, to Leslie and Mac whose love, patience, and compan-
ionship provided a much-needed balance to the demanding schedule of this past
year.
1 Juliet Schor, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: Worktime in Contemporary Context:
Amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 70 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 157 (1994).
2 Id. at 163.
3 KIM MOODY & SIMONE SAGOVAC, LABOR EDUC. & RES. PROJECT, TIME OUT!: THE
CASE FOR A SHORTER WORK WEEK, 10-12 (1995). “[F]or the production and nonsuper-
visory employees that make up 80% of the labor force . . . just to reach their 1973
standard of living, they must work 245 more hours, or 6-plus extra weeks a year.” Id. at
10.
4 See LONNIE GOLDEN & HELENE JORGENSEN, ECON. POL’Y INST. BRIEFING PAPER,
TIME AFTER TIME: MANDATORY OVERTIME IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 1 (January 2002); see
also Linda M. Goldenhar et al., The “Goldilocks Model” of Overtime in Construction: Not
Too Much, Not Too Little, But Just Right, 34 J. SAFETY RES. 215 (2003); INST. FOR WORK-
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and longer hours represents a national crisis that is taking its toll
on working people, slowly depriving them of control over their
health, as well as their time.
U.S. domestic law provides little in the way of economic and
social rights to working people. Therefore, wherever affirmative
obligations on the part of government or employers to ensure ac-
cess to such rights exist, an opportunity exists to expand the pa-
rameters of the law. One such instance is the “general duty” clause
of section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (hereinafter “Act”), which provides: “Each employer–(1)
shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his em-
ployees.”5 This article argues that excessive work hours, resulting
from mandatory and even so-called voluntary overtime, violate the
Act’s general duty clause.
The statute requires an employer to furnish both employment
and a place of employment that are free from hazards. However,
case law interpreting the general duty clause has focused on the
employer’s affirmative obligation to ensure a safe place of employ-
ment to the exclusion of an employer’s affirmative obligation to
ensure that terms and conditions of employment are also free from
recognized hazards. This has led the judiciary and OSHA to take a
narrow view of the use of the general duty clause in ensuring work-
ers’ health and safety.
The problem lies in the conceptual limitations that courts and
regulators have placed on what is deemed a recognized hazard and
the judicial preoccupation with equating that hazard with the phys-
icality of the workplace. Thus, an injury or illness is generally
thought to arise from an accident or exposure caused by some
physical imperfection at the workplace under the employer’s con-
trol, such as inadequate safety equipment or a toxic substance. The
likely reason for this tendency in the case law is the nature of the
injuries that have been litigated and the absence of a meaningful
national debate about the epidemic of overwork6 as a social prob-
PLACE STUDIES, CORNELL UNIV., N.Y. ST. SCH. OF INDUS. & LABOR RELATIONS, OVERTIME
AND THE AMERICAN WORKER (1999); Paul A. Landsbergis, The Changing Organization of
Work and the Health and Safety of Working People: A Commentary, 45 J. OCCUPL. & ENVTL.
MED. 61 (2003).
5 Occupational Safety Health Act (OSHA) § 5(a), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2003).
6 I use the term “overwork” to refer to: (1) workers having to endure an intensi-
fied pace of work demanded by employers over the course of a workday; (2) the prac-
tice of mandatory overtime used by employers to force workers to work additional
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lem, much less as a source of work-related injuries and illnesses. It
cannot be overemphasized that section 5(a)(1) does not expressly
limit the scope of a recognized hazard to physical imperfections in
the workplace, but requires that all the working conditions en-
countered by employees in the course of their employment be free
from such hazards.7 Therefore, even though the employer practice
of mandating or permitting long work hours constitutes an “intan-
gible” employer policy affecting the terms and conditions of work,
rather than a tangible imperfection in the workplace, workers who
suffer injuries and illnesses as a result of such practice should no
longer be denied protection under the general duty clause.
This article will first outline the need for OSHA to include
long working hours within its scope of authority, as illustrated by
current research demonstrating the clear connection between con-
temporary practices of long working hours and work-related inju-
ries and illnesses. Second, the article will develop the legal basis for
an expanded OSHA mandate using statutory language, legislative
history, and case law, recognizing that federal law already limits
work hours in some industries based on health and safety consider-
ations. Third, this article will discuss existing or recently proposed
legislation regulating work hours as a means of protecting worker
health and safety and the inadequacies of these interventions, fol-
lowed by a brief description of similar efforts in other countries.
The article will conclude by defining the contours of a policy,
which OSHA could fashion, to hold employers accountable under
the general duty clause for excessive work hours resulting from
their imposition of mandatory overtime. The implementation of
such a policy can unleash the full power of the general duty clause.
II. THE CASE FOR LONG HOURS AS A RECOGNIZED HAZARD UNDER
THE ACT’S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE
A. Expanding the Notion of Sweatshop Conditions: Overtime as a Form
of Hazard Pay
In the last few decades, the relationship between capital and
labor changed significantly with respect to the division of labor and
hours over their regularly fixed workday (overtime constituting all hours worked over
forty in one week); (3) having to work additional hours or job(s) in addition to a
forty-hour per week full-time job in order to maintain existing or adequate income
levels; or (4) additional family or household members being forced into the labor
market to maintain existing income levels.
7 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW Ch. 9 § 144 at 202
(1998).
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the organization of production systems, resulting in increased
workload demands and job instability. This reorganization of pro-
duction–commonly referred to as “lean production”–uses technol-
ogy and specialized worker skills to create flexible work
arrangements that ensure the continuous flow of production
through various forms of work organization, including outsourc-
ing, casualization, speed-up systems, and longer hours which re-
duce labor costs and job stability, and maximize productivity,
efficiency, competitiveness, and profitability.8 While these struc-
tural changes in the U.S. economy were occurring, inflation out-
paced real wages and the state social welfare system suffered
significant “reforms” and disinvestments. At the workplace level,
the reorganization of the labor force resulted in fewer workers
working longer hours.9
Overwork is a condition, created and sustained by employers,
which benefits them in that it ensures a climate of job instability
and declining wage rates. In describing this new labor supply re-
gime, Bluestone and Rose explain that, instead of being forced to
increase wages to attract labor, employers fill their labor demands
with “incumbent” workers (those already in the labor market) who
work the long hours in expectation of job loss or because of declin-
ing wage rates.10 Policies promoting deregulation and downsizing
of government, the weakening of organized labor, and a legal sys-
8 See generally KIM MOODY, WORKERS IN A LEAN WORLD: UNIONS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMY (Verso 1997); see also NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH (NIOSH), DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. NO. 2002-16,
THE CHANGING ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND THE SAFETY AND HEALTH OF WORKING
PEOPLE: KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 1 (2002); Wayne Lewchuk et al.,
Quality of Working Life in the Automobile Industry: A Canada-UK Comparative Study, 16
NEW TECH. WORK & EMP. 72, 81 (2001):
[Maximizing labor productivity] was pursued either by increasing the
number of seconds worked in each minute, or by regaining manage-
ment control over the workplace so as to reduce regulatory impedi-
ments to management assignment of shifts, overtime, and work tasks.
These changes were articulated through [the] rhetoric of competitive-
ness and labour-management co-operation. Unions in these circum-
stances came under enormous pressure. Growing international
competition for product markets undercut the bargaining strength of
unions as did rising levels of unemployment in the 1980s. Employees
became more vulnerable to company pressures to accept new organisa-
tional strategies which led to harder and longer work. Id.
9 See MOODY, supra note 8; see also Schor, Worktime, supra note 1, at 160; see generally
BARRY BLUESTONE & STEPHEN ROSE, THE UNMEASURED LABOR FORCE: THE GROWTH IN
WORK HOURS (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College, Public Policy Brief No. 40,
1998).
10 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9, at 11-12, 42.
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tem that has given its blessing to employer autocratic flexibility11
have facilitated these developments. Accordingly, the strategy of
overworking workers in the new labor supply regime plays a key
role in lowering their expectations as workplace conditions deteri-
orate. The strategy proves particularly effective in pitting the over-
worked against the underemployed and the unemployed at the
expense of all working people.12
Overtime constitutes an important part of lean production
strategies and of the new labor supply regime because it allows
firms to retreat to their “core competencies,” yet remain profitable
and competitive by maintaining productivity levels.13 Overtime
functions as a buffer during market shifts and downturns by ena-
bling employers to downsize their workforce while working that
smaller workforce longer during market upturns or during more
intensive production cycles.14 Overtime also saves costs associated
with employing additional workers, such as fringe benefits, workers
compensation, social security, and other employee costs.15 Moreo-
ver, the regular use of overtime increases the employment “rent,”
or the value of the job to the worker, based on her or his rate of
compensation, thereby increasing the employer’s control over that
worker.16 This has in turn enabled employers to demand more pro-
ductivity from workers.17 As one state labor official characterized
11 See generally MARC LINDER, THE AUTOCRATICALLY FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE: A HIS-
TORY OF OVERTIME REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Fanpihua Press 2002). Lin-
der’s use of autocratic flexibility refers to the power and right of employers to subject
employees to their authority and control, the only limitations upon such power and
right being minimally prescribed by law and regulation. Such power arises from capi-
tal’s ability to legitimate itself as carrying on business for the benefit of the community
at large. Generally, the law reinforces the notion that employers control the time and
behavior of their workers while on the job.
12 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9, at 43 (finding that increased job instability
creates a feast or famine situation for working people, which explains increases in
voluntary overtime and higher rates of underemployment).
13 MOODY, supra note 8, at 95; see also Lewchuk, et al., supra note 8, at 73, 76 (find-
ing (1) that workers have little control over their workdays since lean production
methods have increased the intensity and duration of work while regulations gov-
erning work and the power of organized labor to resist these forms of managerial
authority have been weakened, leaving workers without protection; and (2) that work-
ers report having little control to vary their workplace or to change working condi-
tions that they do not like while (3) a majority of workers across plants felt forced to
work as fast as possible at least 50% of the time to avoid falling behind and found
there to be inadequate relief staff to cover a worker during a bathroom break).
14 MOODY, supra note 8, at 95; see also MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3, at 14.
15 JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEI-
SURE 62 (BasicBooks 1992); see also MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3, at 14.
16 SCHOR, OVERWORKED, supra note 15, at 62.
17 Id.
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employers’ motivation to demand overtime: “If I have two employ-
ees, I have to pay two Labor and Industries coverage, two medical
care payments, two Social Security. . . . If I can take one employee
and work the heck out of him, then my overall costs are going to be
down.”18 As the statement suggests, employers have an added in-
centive to maintain sweatshop conditions and to include overtime
pay in their bottom lines as they are not held liable for the direct
costs of work-related injuries and illnesses, which are borne in part
by workers and by state workers compensation systems.
While the fast-growing service industry is famous for flexible
work arrangements that lead to low wages and job instability, the
manufacturing sector was the first industry in which downsizing
produced increased productivity with fewer workers through
longer work hours and intensified work pacing.19 For instance,
69% of manufacturing firms who are members of the American
Management Association, downsized their workforces in the early
’90s, and two thirds of these firms reported adverse effects on wor-
kloads as a result of this downsizing.20 Today, the epidemic of over-
work and long work hours reaches into a growing number of
industries and occupations including, but not limited to, the auto-
mobile, home health, construction, garment, and service industries
as well as the medical and legal professions.
As a result of the adoption of lean production, workers have
little choice about not working the long hours demanded by em-
ployers and by lean production systems because of the fear of ter-
mination, unemployment, or because the prospect of similar
working conditions in any new job leaves most workers resigned to
such working conditions. Moreover, job insecurity and the finan-
cial strain of decreasing wages force many workers to desire over-
time work as a way to supplement their wages. In a recent study,
46% of workers interviewed said they wanted to work more over-
time.21 Respondents in the study, who represented unionized work-
ers from several occupational categories, cited job insecurity and
financial strains as the reason for wanting more overtime or for
working second jobs despite an increase in family conflict and risk
of divorce created by excessive work hours.22 Researchers also
found that supervisory pressure to work overtime increased the
18 MARC LINDER, “MOMENTS ARE THE ELEMENTS OF PROFIT”: OVERTIME AND THE
DEREGULATION OF WORKING HOURS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 12 (2000).
19 MOODY, supra note 8.
20 SCHOR, Worktime, supra note 1, at 160.
21 INST. FOR WORKPLACE STUDIES, supra note 4.
22 Id. (indicating that the percentage of workers reporting severe family conflict
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likelihood of workers’ stress, depression, and drinking as well as
incidents of injury and illness.23
The ability of workers (even those represented by unions) to
bargain for improved working conditions traditionally protected by
organized labor and by labor laws has been severely undermined as
a result of the above-described structural changes in the U.S. econ-
omy. At the same time, capital’s control over labor has been
strengthened. An employer-friendly economic climate has been
bolstered by inadequate government regulation of employers due
to disinvestments in monitoring capacities as well as successful at-
tempts at deregulation and by a judiciary that has consolidated
these changes.24 As workers find it increasingly difficult to maintain
annual income earnings and their standard of living based on a
forty-hour workweek, debate over whether overtime is employer-
imposed or freely chosen becomes moot as the need to increase
earnings effectively makes longer work hours necessary.25 It is im-
portant to remember that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
rose from around 5% for those working between forty and fifty hours per week to
approximately 30% for those working over sixty hours).
23 Id.; see also Landsbergis, supra note 4, at 63 (finding that job strain, “defined as
the combination of high job demands and low job control, is an important risk factor
for hypertension and cardiovascular disease (CVD)”).
24 See, e.g., Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that mandatory overtime was an essential job function).
25 Michael L. Smith, Note: Mandatory Overtime and Quality of Life in the 1990s, 21
IOWA J. CORP. L. 599, 600 (1996). Critics could respond to the assertion that workers
have no choice but to work long hours by arguing that the at-will employment doc-
trine protects the rights of the employer and the employee and that both serve at the
other’s will. However, as illustrated by the discussion of lean production in a labor
supply regime characterized by employer flexibility and the facilitation of this new
economy by government and the judiciary, workers’ employment choices are greatly
diminished by the importance of a job to meeting so many worker and family needs,
including access to financial, health, human and social capital, as well as to use of
personal time. Thus, employers’ control over workers through the employment rela-
tionship is far-reaching and can negatively impact the health and safety of working
people. Although controversial, I include so-called voluntary overtime within OSHA’s
mandate to regulate excessive hours. Much of “voluntary” overtime is, in fact, coerced
because of the worker’s financial straits or because long hours are an implied condi-
tion of employment or of career mobility. I therefore do not adopt Golden and Jor-
gensen’s more conservative definition of mandatory overtime. Their definition does
not include economic coercion or subtle forms of retaliation for refusal to work over-
time, such as conditioning career advancement or employment at the point of hire on
overtime work. See GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 2 (defining mandatory over-
time as those hours “above the standard work week (usually forty) that the employer
makes compulsory with the threat of job loss or the threat of other reprisals such as
demotion or assignment to unattractive tasks or work shifts”). See also Anne Spurgeon
et al., Health and Safety Problems Associated with Long Working Hours: A Review of the Cur-
rent Position, 54 OCCUP. & ENV’T MED. 367, 370 (1997) (noting that “effects on wellbe-
ing may be much less in those electing to work overtime, because of internal
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does not give workers the right to refuse overtime. Accordingly,
mandatory overtime should be understood as a broad category en-
compassing long hours worked as the result of explicit employer
demands, as an explicit or implied condition of employment or
career mobility, and as a necessary supplement to low wages.
Furthermore, as workers’ ability to challenge employers’ labor,
health, and safety violations has been compromised across occupa-
tional categories because of structural economic changes and the
lack of governmental regulation and enforcement, the presump-
tion that workers have a choice of leaving undesirable work for a
better job is suspect.26 Indeed, the presumption of free-market eco-
nomic theory, that workers freely accept employment, is as deeply
ingrained as the notion that economic prosperity for all begins
with policies favorable to business.27 These values permeate any dis-
cussion of the employment relationship and represent a powerful
ideological undercurrent against any proposed prohibition of ex-
cessive work hours. Given that this free-market, managerialist ideol-
ogy currently enjoys unprecedented legitimacy, overtime—whether
voluntary or mandatory—has been successfully characterized by
employers and their political and judicial allies as a system that in-
creases the employee’s earnings and the employer’s productivity
and profitability, i.e., it’s good for everyone.
Within this context of the changing organization of work
which leaves many workers little choice but to work overtime and
even less chance of finding new work that does not require it, long
work hours are slowly killing working people. Using the general
duty clause to enlist OSHA’s authority to hold employers accounta-
ble for excessive work hours bolsters the Act. It also gives workers a
substantive basis on which to launch their own workplace organiz-
ing struggles and can play a role in advancing a movement led by
working people to take more control over their time. The legisla-
commitment or enjoyment of work, than in those compelled to do so because of work
overload or company pressure”).
26 See Laureen Snider, Theft of Time: Disciplining through Science and Law, 40 OS-
GOODE HALL L. J. 89, 110 (2002)
(A lineman employed by Central Maine Power in 1999, for example,
was killed when he grasped a 7200 volt cable without first putting on his
insulating gloves. The man had worked two-and-a-half days with a total
of five hours off; every time he went home to bed, he was called back to
work. Had he refused, he certainly would have been disciplined, and
might have been fired. The coroner’s inquest identified fatigue as a
cause of death.).
27 James A. Gross, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: The Broken Promises of the National
Labor Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act: Conflicting Values and Con-
ceptions of Rights and Justice, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 351, 370 (1998).
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tive history of OSHA states that its purpose is to ensure that work-
ers do not have to choose between their health and their work. A
chemical industry worker characterized the relationship between
worker choice and health and safety in an academic study: “the
realities of life—family, the children, mortgage payment—impose
certain limitations on the worker’s right to just quit. I don’t feel
personally that people should have to quit to protect their
health.”28
Long work hours is a condition of work that, like inadequate
safety equipment or toxic exposure, endangers the health and
safety of workers and is within the control of employers. Moreover,
application of the general duty clause to long work hours, whether
mandated by the employer or “voluntarily” worked by an em-
ployee, gives substantive limitations to the free market economic
theory of hazard pay theory (that workers bargain for higher wages
as additional compensation for exposing themselves to workplace
hazards).29 Overtime itself has become a type of hazard pay.
Prohibiting excessive work hours would force employers to stop us-
ing overtime as a way to boost productivity thereby squeezing
greater profits out of workers who are forced to pay with their
health and lives.
Overtime then, like hazard pay, is an example of how workers
are conditioned to assume the costs of employer-created working
conditions with their health and lives. However, unlike the pre-
sumption behind hazard pay, workers have no effective bargaining
power left to resist long work hours. Moreover, employers never
assume the full social costs of the injuries resulting from the work-
ing conditions they create and control, since workers’ compensa-
tion systems shield employers from liability for those injuries.
Therefore, even where employers do pay the overtime premium to
workers, this is ultimately cheaper than the direct cost of the injury
which is primarily borne by the worker, and only partially absorbed
by workers’ compensation. Such cold, bottom-line business calcula-
tions exemplify the cruel and brutal consequences of employer au-
28 Id. at 375.
29 Id. at 374-76. Gross states that, according to free market theory,
workers will bargain for these wage premiums, or hazard pay, as extra
compensation for exposing themselves to workplace hazards and that
employers will pay those wage premiums to attract those workers to haz-
ardous jobs until the cost of removing or substantially reducing the
hazards is less than the cost of the premium pay. . . . Free market eco-
nomic theory assumes that employers have the right to expose workers
to toxic substances and other hazardous conditions of work. Id.
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tocratic flexibility and the dehumanizing way in which employers
apply a cost-benefit analysis to the health and lives of working
people.
The effectiveness with which employers have propagated this
pro-business ideology is illustrated by the fact that it informs the
judicial interpretation of the general duty clause. That is, courts
have, to date, not viewed long work hours as a hazard, and, thus
far, it has been extremely difficult to convince a judge that work
place-related repetitive injuries and illnesses result from ergonomic
hazards. In addition, courts have interpreted the general duty
clause to apply only to recognized hazards which are preventable.30
Courts are also unwilling to consider risks that are inherent in the
conduct of business as violations of the general duty clause. There-
fore, courts recognize the right of employers to expose workers to
toxic substances and other hazardous conditions of work. This has
in turn led to the normalization of sweatshop conditions and the
conditioning of workers to have no choice but to accept such
conditions.
One significant difference between long work hours and other
workplace hazards such as toxic exposure or unsafe equipment is
that the former impacts a much larger segment of the labor
force.31 That is, overwork resulting from long work hours not only
impacts low-wage workers who are disproportionately women, im-
migrants, and people of color, or the less-skilled, less-educated
workers.32 The exemption of professionals from the FLSA’s over-
time provision illustrates how deeply ingrained the preference long
work hours is for this segment of the labor force. Many so-called
white-collar workers accept such conditions in order “to get
ahead,” or to avoid being perceived as not ambitious. Moreover,
this coercive underside to so-called voluntary overtime is not un-
common among other workers who must weigh undesirable work
30 See David J. Kolesar, Note, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA’s General Duty
Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079, 2093 (1992)
(citing Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
31 Gross, supra note 27, at 376. Gross notes that “hazard pay theory . . . affirms as
proper a distribution of power, permitting CEOs and skilled and educated employees
to buy more safety than less educated and less skilled workers.”
32 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9, at 27 (noting an increase in women work-
ing longer hours at the same time their proportion of the workforce is growing).
While long work hours may affect a wider segment of the U.S. labor force than simply
low-wage workers, these workers are probably the hardest hit by this form of overwork,
with respect to injuries and illnesses caused by long hours. For instance, construction
laborers are more at risk than carpenters for work-related injuries due to long work
hours. Telephone Interview with Sue Dong, Data Center Director, Center to Protect
Workers Rights (Oct. 16, 2003).
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hours with career considerations.33 For instance, one construction
worker reports that, “[p]eople who won’t work overtime–it’s just
kind of an unspoken thing. You’re not going to go forward if you
won’t play by the rules.”34
Overwork in the form of long work hours therefore reflects
the downward spiral in working conditions of a large proportion of
U.S. workers. This fact is important to building any social move-
ment based on working people having more control over their
work hours. While there may be class-based distinctions with re-
spect to those who are subjected to the more coercive forms of
mandatory overtime as opposed to those whose decision to work
long hours is viewed as a free choice, this distinction is often exag-
gerated and obscures the lack of control most workers have over
how many hours they work. Indeed, the tendency to compartmen-
talize the problem of sweatshop conditions as affecting only low-
wage workers obscures the shared experience of overwork as a
sweatshop condition for growing numbers of working people. As
discussed above, these sweatshop conditions are impacting growing
numbers of working people who find themselves unable to control
their time, health, and lives as a result of being subjected to longer
hours, lower wages and job insecurity. Regardless of whether over-
time is viewed as an implied condition of employment, necessary to
make ends meet, a system of mobility, or a blatantly coercive em-
ployer tactic, the employer’s need for and ability to extract long
hours from workers constitute a sweatshop condition that threat-
ens worker health and safety and which is within the control of the
employer to abate.
Therefore, so-called voluntary overtime, which is often mis-
characterized as lacking an overtly coercive component, can be just
as detrimental to a worker’s health as mandatory overtime and
under the theory developed in this article, should also fall within
the scope of the general duty clause.35 While including “voluntary”
33 See Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 219. The authors found that construction
workers report having no choice but to agree to work the overtime, both at the point
of hire and upon actual requests by their supervisors. For example, one worker re-
marked, “In the interview process when you first come in, that’s usually the first ques-
tion asked, ‘Are you willing to work a 50 to 60 hour workweek?’ If you say YES they’ll
hire you . . . if you refuse they don’t hire you.” And another worker remarked, “I have,
definitely [seen people laid off for saying no to working overtime].” Id. (alteration in
original).
34 Id.
35 Some commentators are skeptical that a worker’s right to refuse overtime will in
practice be effective and therefore argue for a cap on work hours. See LINDER, AUTO-
CRATICALLY FLEXIBLE, supra note 11; See also GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4 at 4.
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overtime within OSHA’s mandate may appear to infringe upon a
worker’s right to contract, like the minimum wage, an employer
should not be allowed to permit workers to waive their right to
reasonable work hours and a safe and healthy workplace simply
because the employer pays low wages, forcing a worker to endure
long work hours either for individual short-term gain or just to sur-
vive.36 Otherwise, the Act’s intent could be easily undermined. It is
true that many workers depend upon overtime pay simply to sur-
vive and support their families. But, even in such cases, because it is
cheaper for employers to pay workers overtime and thus evade the
direct costs of employer-created working conditions, permitting
employers to overwork the underpaid does not disturb their bot-
tom lines. Instead, workers who are compelled to work excessive
hours and get injured bear the costs of their injuries, as workers
generally receive only limited financial support from workers’ com-
pensation. It is also important to remember that there are cur-
rently systematic efforts in many states to restrict workers’
compensation eligibility and limit benefits.37 Moreover, if OSHA
Citing to the detrimental effects of long work hours on workers’ health and family
life, the authors recommend a cap on excessive work hours. However, the authors
retreat from this recommendation in their conclusions, calling merely for the right to
refuse mandatory overtime for all workers except essential personnel in emergency
situations. Id. at 15. The authors use a 1977 Quality of Employment Survey conducted
by the University of Michigan to estimate a baseline percentage of the U.S. workforce
which is subject to mandatory overtime. The authors define mandatory overtime con-
servatively as overtime that is “mostly up to the employer” and which workers could
not refuse without some kind of penalty, and they define voluntary overtime as that
which is “mostly up to the worker.” Id. at 5. The survey found that 16% of workers
were subjected to such mandatory overtime. In another study one-third of union
workers reported being compelled to work overtime, while 18% worked more over-
time than preferable. Id. at 7. However, while the authors acknowledge that many
workers may have to work long hours to supplement low incomes, they do not view
this as mandatory overtime, and therefore do not analyze how consent or “choice” to
work overtime can be economically coerced, making it effectively mandatory.
36 See LINDER, AUTOCRATICALLY FLEXIBLE supra note 11, at 47. Linder argues that as
workers are not allowed to waive their right to the minimum wage, they should not be
allowed to waive their right to reasonable work hours. While many workers do work
for less than the minimum wage, this merely illustrates that if the law permitted work-
ers to waive this right, it would be even more of a widespread employer practice.
37 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Governor, Statement by Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger on Passage of Workers’ Compensation Reform Legislation (Apr. 16,
2004) (capping temporary disability at two years and giving incentives to employers to
force injured workers back to work), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov/state/
govsite/gov_htmldisplay.jsp?BV_SessionID=@@@@0352729255.1093019980@@@@&
BV_EngineID=ccccadcmfmiemfmcfngcfkmdffidfog.0&sCatTitle=Press+Release&sFile
Path=/Govsite/press_release/2004_04/20040416_GAAS15304_Comp_Statement.htm
l&sTitle=statement£y+Governor+Arnold+Schwarzenegger+on+Passage+of+Workers’+
Compensation+Reform+Legislation&iOID=56167; Al Baker. Governor Calls for Changes
in Workers’ Compensation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at B6 (reporting that New York
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were only to assume regulatory authority to issue citations in situa-
tions of mandatory overtime, an employer could evade the general
duty clause by imposing low wages on workers and thus effectively
compelling them to work long hours in order to supplement their
regular wages. This employer practice of reducing wages, which re-
sults in employees working overtime, has not increased the overall
wages of workers, only the number of work hours it takes to earn
the equivalent of the pre-overtime wage.38 In short, if courts and
regulators applied the general duty clause to a narrow view of
mandatory overtime, many low-wage workers who “voluntarily”
work overtime to make ends meet would be excluded from OSHA
protection.
In sum, while there are differing motivations for working long
hours among workers, some of which derive from inspiration or a
sense of advocacy, it is clear that the new labor supply regime, lean
production, and the job instability associated with these structural
economic changes are forcing working people to work longer
hours simply to maintain existing income levels and standards of
living. An expanded OSHA mandate to prohibit excessive work
hours would appropriately address Congress’ concern regarding
employers’ economic coercion of workers who need to earn a
livelihood.39
Expanding the parameters of mandatory overtime to include
forms of overtime commonly viewed as “voluntary” and therefore
within the purview of the general duty clause represents a signifi-
cant step toward establishing the organization and control of time
as a mechanism that can promote worker health and safety. Em-
phasizing time in this regard as a health and safety concern also
reinforces other policy goals such as increasing worker autonomy,
promoting a better balance between work and non-work life, chal-
Governor George Pataki proposed limiting lifetime benefits to injured workers with
permanent partially disabilities to ten years); Glenn Whittington, Changes in Workers’
Compensation Laws in 2003, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 31-2 (Jan. 2004) (remarking that Flor-
ida changed its law to limit eligibility by requiring injured workers to prove that their
injuries resulting from work-related accidents be more than 50% responsible for that
injury to be compensable).
38 See LINDER, MOMENTS, supra note 18, at 19; see also Schor, Worktime, supra note 1,
at 164.
39 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 15 n.20 (1980) (upholding an OSHA
regulation giving employees acting with the reasonable belief that no less drastic alter-
native is available the right not to perform an assigned task because of a reasonable
apprehension of death or serious injury). However, the Court cited the House Com-
mittee Report which commented, “[T]here is still a real danger that an employee may
be economically coerced into self-exposure in order to earn his livelihood . . . .”); see
also Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. 1596, 1597 (1981).
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lenging the free-market biases that champion increased productiv-
ity and work-spreading, and lowering unemployment which occurs
with shorter working hours.40
Regulating excessive work hours for health and safety pur-
poses is an important pro-worker policy that can both invigorate
the general duty clause of the Act and serve to realign the increas-
ingly diminished bargaining power of workers with regard to the
employment relationship. Like many other government agencies
charged with monitoring employers and places of employment,
OSHA has failed to adequately protect workers.41 While placing
long work hours within an expansive OSHA mandate will not tran-
40 There is ongoing debate as to whether a shorter workweek or worksharing ar-
rangements generate employment. See Schor, Worktime, supra note 1. But cf., DIMITRI
B. PAPADIMITRIOU, JEROME LEVY ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF BARD COLLEGE, FULL EM-
PLOYMENT HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED: FULL EMPLOYMENT POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
13 (1999) (arguing that dealing with structural unemployment requires increasing
the demand for labor rather than rationing work, and indicating that in Europe, re-
ducing work hours failed to increase employment rates and resulted in loss of output,
inflation, and imbalance of trade).
41 See Brett R. Gordon, Comment, Employee Involvement in the Enforcement of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Laws of Canada and the United States, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 527,
535, 536, 540 (1994). This article argues that while the Act’s substantive provisions
promised adequate protection for worker health and safety, ineffective enforcement
“has largely eliminated any positive effect of the Act.” Id. at 535. Gordon cites three
primary enforcement problems: (1) a small number of inspectors charged with pro-
tecting millions of employees in a large number of workplaces, (2) OSHA’s policy of
“forced consultation,” which seeks employer cooperation rather than issuing sanc-
tions, and (3) the burden of persuasion placed on the worker to show retaliatory
discrimination, which results in a low percentage of employee complaints being re-
ferred by OSHA to United States district courts. Id. at 535-40. These facts together
ensure that only a small percentage of the workforce actually benefits from inspec-
tions or OSHA’s enforcement power, and even fewer from follow-up inspections, and
what inspection there is usually fails to result in fines, which gives employers little
incentive to implement abatement measures. Id. In cases in which a fine is actually
levied, employers can reduce the amount by appealing or by showing a “willingness to
comply.” The result of few inspections, the unfair employee complaint burden, and
occasional slaps on the wrist is that poor safety records are obscured, enabling em-
ployers to enjoy relative immunity from the Act’s reach and creating reluctance on
the part of workers to file complaints “in fear of retaliation, despite a provision in the
OSH Act which prohibits employer retaliation.” Id.
As long ago as the mid-1980s, the Office of Technology estimated that 100,000
workers die each year from occupational diseases and 6,000 more die in work-related
accidents. Gross, supra note 27, at 357. Despite these numbers, there is no resolve to
address the issue of health and safety in the workplace. A 1999 Public Citizen report
found that the total number of OSHA inspections had steadily declined since 1975
and was at its lowest during the Clinton Administration. PETER LURIE, MARTI LONG &
SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUBLIC CITIZEN, REINVENTING OSHA: DANGEROUS REDUCTIONS IN
ENFORCEMENT DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1999), available at http://www.
publiccitizen.org/publications/print_release.cfm?ID=6693. Accordingly, inadequate
governmental regulation ensures employer impunity as approximately four thousand
federal and state OSHA inspectors are tasked with inspecting six million workplaces
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scend the agency’s under-enforcement problems, it would serve to
inform working people of the Act and its general duty clause,
thereby making the agency more accountable to workers in their
struggle to gain greater control over their health and lives.42 As
James Gross has observed, OSHA’s promise to workers to “assure so
far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe
and healthful working conditions” has been transformed into a
promise to employers that health and safety will not interfere with
competitiveness, efficiency, and profitability.43 Determining that
long work hours violates the health and safety of working people
challenges the prevailing view that grants employers ever-increas-
ing autocratic flexibility and puts people before competitiveness,
efficiency, and profitability.
1. Longer Hours and Mandatory Overtime
As discussed above, the rise in work hours is largely due to
structural changes in the United States economy. In an effort to
impose lean production systems, employers have sought to destroy
the social wage, the agreement by which an employer sought to
maintain dependable employees through the promise of higher
wages and long-term employment. Overtime has been combined
with many other employer strategies to increase job instability and
reduce labor costs such as downsizing, subcontracting, outsourc-
ing, women entering the workforce, and the use of temporary, con-
tingent, and part-timer workers.44 Moreover, longer working hours
do not translate into an improved standard of living for working
people.45
in order to ensure the safety of ninety-two million employees. Gross, supra note 27, at
362
42 While the under- and non-enforcement of labor and health and safety law
makes using the law to effect real change in the employment relationship suspect, it
does not follow that progressive lawyers should not challenge the myriad ways the law
reinforces social inequalities. Since the under/non-enforcement of labor and health
and safety laws has become a primary strategy proponents of employer autocratic flex-
ibility have used to lower workers’ expectations of working conditions and thereby
acquiesce to them, an important part of any movement led by working people to
transform the employment relationship is to demand: (1) an end to the systematic
under/non-enforcement of labor and health and safety laws, and (2) a re-elaboration
of those laws in ways that institutionalize greater worker control over the employment
relationship so that workers have more say over the social conditions that affect their
lives.
43 Gross, supra note 27, at 352, 357.
44 See MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3 (explaining how overtime is profitable for
employers); see also Schor, Worktime, supra note 1, at 158 (discussing women entering
the workforce as a reason for rising working hours).
45 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9, at 29 (noting that a little over 1% annual
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Working hours for United States workers have risen over the
last two decades. However, reliable comparative numbers of hours
worked (voluntarily or involuntarily) are difficult to obtain either
by industry or workers. The numbers available, however, regarding
the increase in work hours, vary depending on the source, time
period, and employee cohort as well as unit of analysis. For in-
stance, one figure puts the annual average increase of 138 hours
for workers generally.46 Another study found that from 1967 to
1989 there was a sixty-six hour increase in annual work hours, with
most of the rise coming from additional hours worked rather than
additional weeks.47 This same study showed that by the end of the
1980s, dual-earning couples were working an additional day-and-a-
half per week which came out to an additional 684 hours annually,
or four full months of full-time work.48 Other figures, based on the
workweek as the unit of analysis, indicate a rise in overtime; from
one-and-a-half extra hours for workers generally49 to 4.9 hours ex-
tra per week for employees in the manufacturing industry.50 Other
statistics show that the average number of overtime hours has
jumped 48% since 1991, and that United States workers work 350
more hours, or nine more full-time weeks, than Europeans.51 One in
five workers works more than forty-nine hours per week, while im-
migrant workers are forced to work upwards of eighty or ninety
hours per week.52 Although several reports in the last few years
have recognized the trend of longer working hours, the statistics
used do not tell the story of many working people. A Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) report in the February 2000 Monthly Labor
Review found that overtime hours worked in manufacturing dur-
ing most of the 1990s had risen to almost five hours.53 However,
increase in standard of living for prime-age working couples resulted not from “im-
proved wages, but from increased work effort.”).
46 Schor, Worktime, supra note 1, at 158.
47 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9, at 26.
48 Id. at 28.
49 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 1.
50 Ron L. Hetrick, Analyzing the Recent Upward Surge in Overtime Hours, 123
MONTHLY LAB. REV., at 30 (2000).
51 IT’S ABOUT TIME!–CAMPAIGN FOR WORKER’S HEALTH (2001), at http://
www.nmass.org/nmass/wcomp/workerscomp.html (on file with the New York City
Law Review).
52 Id.
53 Hetrick, supra note 50. “[A]verage overtime is computed by dividing the total
number of overtime hours in a given industry by the number of production workers
in that industry, including those that work no overtime at all.” Id. Hetrick’s calcula-
tion should be questioned, as this figure does not include overtime worked but not
paid for, nor does it distinguish those types of workers who regularly work long hours.
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this number does not reflect the long hours worked by many work-
ing people in the U.S. across industry and class. The same can be
said for ILO statistics, which indicate that “annual work hours are
four percent higher than they were in 1980, amounting to an extra
one hour and 30 minutes at work per week, per average.”54
These statistics fail to capture the real work hours many work-
ing people are forced to endure either because they are mandated
by employers or because they view overtime as a way to supplement
their meager earnings. Behind these modest increases in work
hours is the untold story of twelve-, sixteen-, or eighteen-hour work
days and ninety to 100 hour workweeks to which workers in indus-
tries such as garment, telecommunications, auto, home health,
meatpacking, poultry processing, and construction are subjected.
In some of these industries in which low wage, immigrant, or wo-
men workers predominate, the overtime is not even paid.55 Moreo-
ver, because the FLSA covers only 60% of wage and salary workers,
these statistics obscure the millions of U.S. workers exempt from
the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
which mandate time-and-a-half premium pay for all work per-
formed over 40 hours.56 Finally, the low statistical increases of over-
time hours worked belie even the BLS’s own findings that the
economic recovery of the 1990s relied upon the use of increased
overtime rather than hiring new employees.57
2. Frenetic Work Paces, Work Speed-Ups, and Employee
Monitoring
Though the purpose of this article is to formulate a legal argu-
ment for using the general duty clause to prohibit excessive work
hours, any policy that would take shape around this idea must an-
ticipate likely employer responses. One such likely response that is
already widely used as part of the lean production trend in the
economy is to simply make employees do more in less time
through imposing work speed-ups, forcing employees to work at
more frenetic paces,58 and increased employee monitoring sys-
54 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4.
55 See generally Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for
Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 297 (2003).
56 MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3 at 13.
57 Hetrick, supra note 50, at 33.
58 See generally Lewchuk, et al., supra note 8; MOODY, supra note 8; see generally Marc
Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken that Had No Bone: Joint Firm-State Responsibility for
Line-Speed-Related Occupational Injuries, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 33 (1995).
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tems59 to ensure adherence to these working conditions.
In fact, speed-up production is already an integral part of the
lean production system that has workers working longer hours at
more frenetic paces as a way to increase productivity while at the
same time keeping labor costs down. In a 1990 survey of eighty-five
manufacturers, managers reported using the following speed-up
techniques: just-in-time (JIT) method 52%; total quality manage-
ment (TQ) 56%; work teams 31%; and statistical process control
(SPC) 79%.60 These workplace organization techniques are based
in differing degrees on employer-oriented flexibility designed to
increase productivity. They are also part of a larger ideological war
currently being won by employers and their political and judicial
allies that characterizes workers’ time on the job as the property of
their employer.61 Any “misuse” of that time therefore constitutes a
social problem deemed to be a “crime against capital.”62 Their ef-
forts to further institutionalize and prevent theft of employers’
time through time management and lean production techniques
have been legitimized by science and social science, enforced by
the legal system, and disseminated by the mass media.63 Conse-
quently, greater employee monitoring can lead to worsening work-
place conditions and increased injuries and illnesses, as well as to
59 Snider, supra note 26. Snider reports that in white collar firms “45 percent of
American companies now monitor all electronic communication,” id. at 102, while
office workers and on the shop and factory floors, “computer monitoring through
automated time-and-attendance video display systems record employees’ in-and-out
times, compute hours worked, and individual and collective levels of productivity.” Id.
at 103. Other methods include electronic surveillance systems which monitor the
coming and going of employees, the number of keystrokes, phone calls, and em-
ployee performance compared to expert-created projected goals. Id.
60 MOODY, supra note 8, at 102. Many of these techniques enlist the employees
themselves in finding ways to improve efficiency and performance and, one can ar-
gue, thereby effectively eliminating their own jobs. See also Snider, supra note 26, at
103.
61 See Snider, supra note 26, at 109 (Snider concludes, “It is ironic that theft of time
has emerged as a social problem at a time when employers are increasingly stealing
time from employees.”).
62 Id. at 91-92. Snider writes,
Through deregulation, decriminalization, and downsizing, corporate
crime vanished, ideologically, politically, and legally. However, at the
same time that laws disciplining employers disappeared, laws disciplin-
ing employees were strengthened. The legal rights of employees, such
as the right to resist sixty-hour work weeks, or refuse work in unsafe
environments were eliminated, while new offences against employers
were discovered and denounced. Theft of time, invented and brokered
as a social problem by academics in business schools, organizational psy-
chology, sociology, and criminology, is a quintessential example of this
process. Id.
63 Id. at 92-93.
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overwork, the principal goal of the monitoring.64
B. Existing Research Linking Overtime and Long Hours to Safety and
Health
1. Long Hours Linked to Increased Risk of Safety
Accidents, Injuries and Illnesses, and Fatigue and
Stress
Long work hours are linked to increased risk of safety inci-
dents, injuries, and illnesses, as well as increased fatigue and stress.
Perhaps the most recent well-publicized example of the relation-
ship between long work hours and stress and fatigue is in the
health care industry, particularly as long hours impact the work of
nurses65 and medical residents.66 In a petition to OSHA requesting
that the agency use its regulatory authority to limit the number of
hours medical residents could work, the drafters of the petition
used research findings illustrating how excessive work hours (up to
130 hours per week) resulted in increased risk of auto crashes, neg-
ative mental effects, including sleep deprivation, fatigue, and de-
pression, and obstetric complications including pre-term
hospitalization, preeclampsia or eclampsia, decreased birth
weights, intrauterine growth retardation, and preterm delivery.67
Their petition requested, among other changes, limiting medical
resident work hours to eighty hours per week with one shift lasting
no more than twenty-four consecutive hours, and a minimum of
ten hours off-duty time between shifts.68 A study conducted by
Wayne State University found that among medical residents, there
is a 6.7 odd ratio increase of motor vehicle crashes due to falling
asleep at the wheel during their residency compared to before
64 Id. at 103. Snider explains,
Overall, nervous breakdowns increase with the level of surveillance,
while general health deteriorates. Fatigue or exhaustion, depression,
apathy, stress, anxiety, pain in shoulders and wrists, stomach and back,
indigestion, nausea, and sleep disturbances are common. A workplace
“syndrome” has been legitimized by the name “bathroom-break harass-
ment,” defined as the reluctance to take bathroom breaks for fear of
losing one’s job. Id.
65 See California Nurses Association, available at http://www.calnurse.org (discuss-
ing California Nurses Association (“CNA”) fight against mandatory overtime).
66 See generally Petition to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Re-
questing that Limits be Placed on Hours Worked by Medical Residents (Apr. 30,
2001) (hereinafter “Petition”), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/
print_release.cfm?ID=6771.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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their residency.69
Depression, sleep deprivation, and fatigue that result from
long resident work hours increase the risk of accident and errors
with regard to patient service delivery. In a study of 254 residents,
45% reported making mistakes, 41% of whom admitted their mis-
takes were due to fatigue and 31% of whom reported their errors
resulted in patient death.70 Despite the risks to both residents and
patients, OSHA refused to exercise its regulatory authority, claim-
ing instead that the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education (ACGME) already regulated work hours.71 Although
ACGME recently implemented limits on resident work hours to
eighty hours per week, Public Citizen still advocates for a federal
standard arguing that ACGME, a private entity whose accreditation
is voluntary, does not have the enforcement power necessary to
stop long work hours in the industry.72
The California Nurses Association (CNA) has led its profes-
sion’s attempts to limit nurses’ work hours. Along with nursing as-
sociations from Massachusetts, Maine, and Pennsylvania, the CNA
backed national legislation, H.R. 1289 (Registered Nurses and Pa-
tients Protection Act), that would amend the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 to prohibit mandatory overtime for licensed health
care workers.73 Recent victories in Long Beach and San Jose illus-
trate that the CNA is also winning mandatory overtime bans as part
of hospital collective bargaining agreements.74 Responding to
nurses who report working sixteen, twenty, and twenty-eight-plus
hours, the CNA advocates a ban on mandatory overtime because it
sees a direct connection between long hours, nursing shortages,
and patient safety.75 CNA President Kay McVay observed that
“[n]urses find that at the end of a long shift [they] are being man-
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Letter from John L. Henshaw, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and
Health, U.S. Department of Labor, to Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen
Health Research Group (Oct. 4, 2002) available at www.publiccitizen.org.
72 Id.
73 Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass’n, First Hearing Set on Bill to Ban Mandatory
Overtime CNA: State Law Needed to Protect Patient Safety (Apr. 11, 2001) available at
www.calnurse.org.
74 See Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass’n, No More Mandatory Overtime Long Beach
Memorial RNs Reach Agreement, Cite Major Gains in Wages, Retirement Security
(Dec. 8, 2002) available at www.calnurse.org; Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass’n, Wage
Increases & Ban on Mandatory Overtime Citing Gains, Newly Organized RNs at
O’Connor Hospital Ratify New Contract (Sept. 19, 2002) (banning mandatory over-
time except in declared emergencies) available at www.calnurse.org.
75 See Cal. Nurses Ass’n, First Hearing Set, supra note 73.
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dated to work another eight hours or more, when they no longer
have the stamina and mental alertness to provide the quality care
their patients need.”76
Numerous studies demonstrate the detrimental effect of long
work hours on worker health and safety.77 Research indicates that
overtime increases the risk of injury and illness. In a German study,
researchers found that in the twelfth hour of work, the accident
rate was double the rate of the first nine hours of work.78 This was
also the finding in a study using the National Census Household
Survey that found the injury rate among all workers increased 50%
after more than fifty work-hours per week.79 Furthermore, the long
work hours exacerbate existing workplace hazards such as repeti-
tive motion disorder and the permissible exposure limits (PELs) to
toxic substances.80 It is important to remember that PELS designed
to protect workers, are derived from a normal 40 hour workweek.
Consequently, a worker who works in excess of forty hours will have
an increased risk of injury or illness from this overexposure.81
Golden and Jorgensen also report that “frequent overtime and
compressed work schedules that produce long workdays can be a
major cause of the stress and chronic fatigue reported by many
workers, as well as the ensuing occupational burnout or serious
health conditions.”82 Long hours that produce such fatigue and ex-
haustion can also increase the risk of human error and perform-
ance-impaired and overexertion injuries. A common result of
76 Id.
77 To be sure, the relationship between long work hours and injuries and illnesses
is complicated by other variables, such as industry and occupation-type, shiftwork,
nightwork, physical demands of the job, age and gender, and other environmental
stressors, such as working conditions of overtime work, noise, temperature, time pres-
sure, distractions, and faulty equipment. For a survey of the current research, see
GOLDEN & JORGENSON, supra note 4; see also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25; Land-
sbergis, supra note 4.
78 See Golden & Jorgensen, supra note 4, at 3 (citing a study by Hanecke et al.,
noting that the accident risk for German workers increased exponentially beyond the
ninth hour at work).
79 Dong, supra note 32.
80 GOLDEN & JORGENSON, supra note 4, at 3. See also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25,
at 368. Spurgeon claims:
[i]t is arguable that the relation between hours of work and ill health is
mediated by stress, in that long hours act both directly as a stressor, in
increasing the demands on a person who attempts to maintain perform-
ance levels in the face of increasing fatigue, and indirectly by increasing
the time that a worker is exposed to other sources of workplace stress.
81 Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 374.
82 GOLDEN & JORGENSON, supra note 4, at 3; see also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25,
at 369 (finding that, in response to stress, workers adopt coping strategies, or mal-
adaptive behaviors such as substance abuse, which can exacerbate health problems).
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working long hours is stress, which is estimated to cost $200 billion
a year by the ILO.83 Another commentator reports that, “one U.S.
survey found that almost a quarter of the workforce aged 25-44 suf-
fered from stress-induced nervous strain severe enough to ‘dimin-
ish performance.’”84 Stress due to long work hours has been linked
to high blood pressure and cardiovascular disease.85 For instance, a
Northwestern National Life study “found that seven out of ten em-
ployees experiencing job stress suffered health ailment [and that]
[f]requent mandatory overtime was one of the leading five factors
that caused increased stress.”86 Moreover, stress-related workers
compensation claims tripled between 1980 and 1985.87 Finally, a
study published in the Journal of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine found that working more than forty hours per week in-
creased the chance of heart attacks and that men working more
than sixty hours per week were twice as likely to suffer heart attacks
as those working forty-hour weeks.88
83 Mara Eleina Conway, Karoshi: Is It Sweeping America?, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
352, 367 (1997).
84 Id. at 374.
85 GOLDEN & JORGENSON, supra note 4, at 3; see Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at
371 (citing a study that found that
in 100 coronary patients under the age of 40 the presence of severe
occupational strain—that is, very long working hours—was more than
four times that in a control group. Seventy-one percent of the coronary
group had for a prolonged period, either worked both days and eve-
nings or had worked more than 60 hours a week.).
Another study detailed by Spurgeon “concluded that the mortality risk from coronary
heart disease was greater in men under the age of 44 who worked more than 48 hours
a week in certain occupations, notably those not involving heavy physical work, a fac-
tor which seemed to offer some protection.” Id.; see also Landsbergis, supra note 4, at
65.
86 GOLDEN & JORGENSON, supra note 4, at 3 (“Employees who worked overtime on a
regular basis were twice as likely (62% vs. 34%) to report that they found their jobs to
be highly stressful.”).
87 Conway, supra note 83, at 353. Stress is a compensable factor in the U.S. workers
compensation system. See generally id. at 353-379. Two tests for determining whether
stress is compensable are used in most workers compensation system jurisdictions: the
unusual stress test and the objective causation test. Id. at 377. “Under the unusual
stress test, ‘an employee’s recovery depends not only on whether gradual stress actu-
ally caused her injury, but also on whether the stress she suffered differed from that
experienced by her co-workers.’“ Id. On the other hand, the objective causation, ”sim-
ply requires the disabled worker to establish a causal connection between the work-
place and the mental injury; she need not establish that the stress that caused the
injury is unusual or extraordinary.“ Id.
88 Maxine Frith Heart, Attacks Linked to Long Hours at Work, THE EVENING STANDARD
(London) July 10, 2002, at 15. The study went on to find that
[t]he risk trebled for men who had less than five hours’ sleep a night for
at least two days in the working week. Researchers said the results were
so significant that people should work no more than 40 hours a week
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The relationship between overwork and health is recognized
in some countries. In 2001, the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission ruled that “people could not be forced to work exces-
sive overtime if it affected their family responsibilities or their
health and safety.”89 In Japan, laws have been enacted to regulate
work hours and minimize karoshi, which means death from over-
work.90 For instance, a government study found that ten women
died from overwork in 2001 and twenty-two others suffered mental
problems, including stress and depression due to overwork.91 In
that same year, Japan’s Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry re-
ported receiving almost seven hundred submissions of karoshi and
determined that 143 deaths were caused by overwork, as deter-
mined by new standards adopted in December 2000.92 The Na-
tional Institute of Public Health indicates three contributory
factors to karoshi: “heavy physical labor; long hours of overtime,
working without days off; late night work and other factors that
obstruct biological rhythms; and excessive stress resulting from fac-
tors like overly intense work responsibilities, solitary job transfers
and undesired job assignments or transfers.“93 The new standards
and have at least two weekdays off a month to reduce the chances of
heart disease. Researchers in Japan studied the lives of 260 men be-
tween the ages of 40 and 79 who had suffered a first heart attack, and
compared them to 445 men of a similar age with no history of heart
disease. They found that the heart attack victims were significantly more
likely to have been working longer hours, having fewer days off and less
sleep than the healthy men. Study author Dr. Suminori Kono, from Kyu-
shu University in Japan, said: “These findings suggest that chronic over-
work and sleep deprivation confer an increased risk of heart attack.”
Previous studies have found that overtime work can increase blood pres-
sure and heart rate and cause chest pain, depression and fatigue. Lack
of sleep can also lead to a rise in blood pressure and heart abnormalities
which can cause cardiac arrest. Id.
89 Melissa King & Miles Kemp, Long Working Hours; Living to Work, THE ADVERTISER,
August 29, 2002, at 19.
90 Conway, supra note 83, at 359. Japanese labor laws permit an employer to re-
quire employees to work longer than the eight-hour day, forty-eight-hour workweek
maximum, if there is a written agreement between the employer and labor union or a
representative of a majority of employees specifying the limits and reasons for the
extension. See also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 372 (noting that in Japan, long
working hours are thought to be a major contributory factor to karoshi, which is “a
sociomedical term referring to a range of cardiovascular attacks such as strokes, myo-
cardial infarction, or acute cardiac failure resulting from hypertensive or arterioscle-
rotic disease”).
91 More Japanese Women Suffering Mental Problems from Overwork. JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEWSWIRE, February 17, 2003.
92 Record 143 Overwork-Related Cases Recorded in FY 2001. JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE,
May 22, 2002.
93 Conway, supra note 83, at 355, 356. The American Heart Association (AHA)
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provide that “death or severe effects caused by overwork are deter-
mined to be the cause if a person works more than 100 hours of
overtime in the month before she or he dies, or suffers severe ef-
fects.”94 The standard allows an examiner, when determining
whether karoshi has occurred, to consider the working conditions
of the employee for up to six months prior to the employee’s
death.95 It is estimated that over one-fifth of Japanese male workers
work more than eighty hours of overtime per month, the threshold
at which the government says overwork becomes dangerous.96
Many U.S. industries are especially hard-hit by long work
hours, particularly where ever-increasing productivity levels are pri-
oritized over the health of workers. In the garment industry, well
known for its exploitive subcontracting system that employs mostly
immigrant labor, workers are subjected to compulsory long work
hours accompanied by intimidation, constant surveillance, restric-
tions on movement, non-payment of wages, heavy lifting, and re-
petitive work.97 Workers fear retaliation and termination for
reporting injuries to employers who maintain tight controls over
them through low wages, constant monitoring, and abusive super-
vision. Shift workers are similarly overworked to the point of ex-
haustion. A recent study concluded that job cuts increased
overtime hours and accidents due to human error caused by stress
and overwork.98 The study found the number of shift workers
identifies these same factors as those contributing to heart failure in America. Id. at
375. In fact, Conway remarks that the AHA study concluded that, ”where the ability to
describe the causal connection between the ailment and the injury or death exists, the
statistics tend to show proof that this is a serious problem that arises from stress.” Id.
94 Record 143 Overwork-Related Cases Recorded in FY 2003, supra note 92 (“The new
standards also take into consideration fatigue over a six-month period.”).
95 Man’s Death Acknowledged as Stemming from Overwork, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEWSWIRE,
May 29, 2002. Significantly, the court acknowledged death from overwork as a result
of accumulated fatigue due to excessive work even though the decedent had only
worked for the employer for 52 days as a part-time employee. Id.
96 Shane Green, Rising Overtime Drives Workers To Death Zone, THE AGE (Melbourne)
Oct. 29, 2002, at 12. The article adds, “Japanese courts are also showing a willingness
to force companies to pay compensation to bereaved families.” Id.
97 Helen Chen, Caucus Undertakes Workplace Health Safety Issues. THE REPORTER.
(Asian Law Caucus) July 2002, at 1 & 4; see also Lung, supra note 55, at 297.
98 Cutbacks Hit 24-Hour Facilities, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 1, 2002, at 9L;
see also, Survey Finds Staffing Levels Stretched Too Thin, NUCLEAR NEWS, Jan. 2003, at 18
(Reporting results from the same study, “2002 Shiftwork Practices,” conducted by Cir-
cadian Technologies, Inc. (CTI) of managers from 623 facilities, representing nearly
120,000 employees, from a range of 24/7 operations including utilities, manufactur-
ing, process production, public safety, health care and service industries. The survey
reports that “other studies also have demonstrated that mandatory overtime is costing
employers in the United States $150 billion per year in occupational accidents and
injuries.”).
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working more than four hundred annual hours of overtime had
increased 45% and employee fatigue 101% since 2000. Seventy-
three percent of facilities reported using holdovers (where the shift
length is increased or doubled) to cover needed overtime, while
those workplaces reporting no employee fatigue have decreased by
52%.99
Workers in other industries experience the same increased
risk of injury due to accidents resulting from excessive work hours.
In the auto industry, Moody reports that the average incidence of
illness and injuries in the early 1990s was five times the average
level of the early and mid-1980s.100 Autoworkers who work over-
time are more likely to experience fatigue and depression and suf-
fer from “impaired performance in attention and executive
functions.”101 Accident rates for autoworkers increase during over-
time hours.102 The injury rate for auto assemblers rose from five in
1985 to 28.3 in 1991, an increase of 460%. In 1992, the rate in-
creased to 32.3%.103 Moreover, during this same time period, pro-
ductivity levels rose 81%, exemplifying the direct correlation
between speed-up production practices and long work hours.104
In a study of nuclear power plant safety, the more overtime
hours an operator worked, the more safety performance problems
occurred due to fatigue-induced operator errors.105 Construction
workers report suffering from sleep deprivation, fatigue, and work-
related stress both on the job and in their personal lives.106 Studies
in the transportation industry demonstrate an increased risk of ac-
cidents after eight or nine-and-one-half hours of driving. One study
found that the accident rate doubled after 12 hours.107 The Fed-
eral Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) found that
commercial drivers were sixteen times more likely to have a fatal
accident during the thirteenth hour of driving than during the first
hour.108 Another study of commercial drivers concluded that risk
99 See id.
100 MOODY, supra note 8, at 191. See also Lewchuk et al., supra note 8, at 79 (citing a
study that showed that nearly half of automobile plant employees worked in physical
pain or discomfort at least half the time).
101 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 3.
102 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 3.
103 MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3, at 32.
104 Id.
105 Kathryn Baker et al., Work Practices, Fatigue, and Nuclear Power Plant Safety Perform-
ance, HUMAN FACTORS, 244, 251 (1994).
106 Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 220-21.
107 Petition, supra note 66.
108 Id.
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of accident rose 50% after the first four driving hours, 80% be-
tween the 7th and 8th hour, and 130% until the end of 9th
hour.109 The FAA found that 21% of aviation accidents were due to
fatigue.110
New research is beginning to show the direct connection be-
tween increased risk of injury and illness and the new forms of lean
production and flexible work arrangements, particularly overtime
and work intensification due to downsizing. For instance, downsiz-
ing, resulting in reduced staffing and subsequent longer hours due
to increased workloads, has been associated with increased rates of
fatal injuries, high blood pressure and cardiovascular disease, and
work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs) in a wide range
of industries and occupations.111 Work intensification and long
hours are correlated with low job control, suggesting that excessive
hours may not be as stressful or as hazardous where there is greater
worker autonomy and decreased job strain.112
Injuries and illnesses have become the norm in many U.S. in-
dustries as a result of the physical demands placed on workers who
have no choice but to submit to the overwork and speed-up pro-
duction techniques imposed by employers. To illustrate the extent
to which so many workers continue to live and work in pain,
Moody and Sagovac report that in 1992, “half of the over two mil-
lion non-fatal occupational injuries resulting in days off work in-
volved sprains and strains; a third of these were cumulative trauma
disorders.”113 Despite employer attempts to squeeze more work out
of workers through longer work hours at a more frenetic pace,
there is research that suggests that such short-term increases in
profitability and productivity create long-term harm by “decreasing
quality, increasing mistakes, and reducing productivity.”114 In fact,
workers reported that even their short-term productivity suffered
as a result of overtime.115 It is estimated that job stress alone costs
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Landsbergis, supra note 4, at 66.
112 Id.
113 MOODY & SAGOVAC, supra note 3, at 32.
114 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 3.
115 Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 221. With regard to the adverse effects of
overtime on their productivity, one worker interviewed stated, “when you do continu-
ous overtime—60 hours a week. It’s not that much work being done when you’re
working all of those hours and the body becomes stressed. You tend to stop a lot, take
more breaks than normal.” See also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 372-73 (describ-
ing early studies that demonstrate reducing overtime and work hours (from between
five and twenty hours) did not reduce productivity levels and in some cases increased
productivity while at the same time it reduced absenteeism).
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U.S. industries $150 billion a year in absenteeism, health insurance
premiums, diminished productivity, workers’ compensation claims,
and direct medical costs.116 The problem has even prompted insur-
ance companies to warn policy holders that permitting or mandat-
ing excessive work hours can lead to increased injuries and
financial costs.117
Nevertheless, employer and government responses to injuries
and health problems that result from long working hours have
been woefully inadequate. This is in large part because long work
hours benefit employers and play a crucial role in the new labor
supply regime of providing necessary labor while controlling infla-
tion.118 Moreover, the problem remains obscured by the U.S. gov-
ernment’s failure to systematically track overtime hours by
industry. However, the National Occupational Research Agenda
(NORA), a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)-affiliated project designed to guide and organize re-
search efforts in occupational health and safety, has recently called
for more targeted and comprehensive studies on the relationship
between long work hours and worker health and safety and has
established a working group to continue to work on this issue.119
While this is promising, future research must address and identify
interventions that remedy the causes of health problems due to
long work hours, such as overexertion injuries, cumulative trauma,
mental health, and cardiovascular disorders, stress, fatigue, exhaus-
tion, and even diabetes, rather than be used solely to treat the
symptoms of overwork by emphasizing improved safety training, in-
creased supervision, stress and time management, or by addressing
116 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 3; see also NUCLEAR NEWS, supra note 98
(indicating that “other studies have demonstrated that mandatory overtime is costing
employers in the United States $150 billion per year in occupational accidents and
injuries”).
117 Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 223 (citation omitted).
118 See BLUESTONE & ROSE, supra note 9.
119 NIOSH, supra note 8, at 15. The authors call for research focusing on increased
risk of injury and illness resulting from the demands and fatigue associated with long
work hours and identify the need to develop improved methods for measuring work
hours with particular attention to safety outcomes and populations especially subject
to working long hours. Id. Specific research areas identified include:
(1) The effects of modest increases in working hours. (2) How effects of
long work hours might be modified by alternative work schedules and
work-rest regimens, and varying domestic demands. (3) Task-specific ef-
fects of long work hours (e.g., effects of long work hours for physically
demanding tasks and other hazardous exposures). (4) The effects of
unplanned and mandatory overtime. Id.
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workplace violence or substance abuse.120 Such policy responses
further institutionalize and normalize long work hours. Instead, a
national consensus must be built that recognizes “50 hours as a
threshold” after which work hours become excessive and “detri-
mental to health and well-being” by increasing the risk of work-
related injuries and illnesses.121
III. INTERPRETING THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE TO PROHIBIT LONG
WORK HOURS
A. Statutory Basis for Including Long Hours Within OSHA’s Mandate
1. General Duty Clause
The general duty clause of the Act was intended to apply to
serious hazards to which no specific standard already applies.122
While the Occupational Safety and Heath Review Commission
(OSHRC)123 and the courts have disallowed 5(a)(1) citations when
there is an applicable standard, no OSHA standard exists for the
regulation of work hours for employees generally. Furthermore, it
would be impossible to formulate precise standards establishing
hazardous levels of work hours applicable across industries and oc-
cupations or, for that matter, which could even differentiate be-
tween job duties within a single workplace. Therefore, expanding
OSHA’s mandate to the regulation of excessive work hours is most
appropriately achieved through the general duty clause.
The purpose of the Act was “to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our human resources.”124 The Act’s
Congressional Findings and Purpose demonstrate that Congress in-
tended the Act to provide the regulatory basis upon which the
American workplace could realize optimal health and safety.125 In
this spirit, the general duty clause protects workers from recognized
120 See Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 224; see also Spurgeon et al., supra note 25,
at 370.
121 Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 371, 374.
122 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 197.
123 Section 12 of the Act establishes the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission (OSHRC). 29 U.S.C. § 661 (2000). The OSHRC is a three-member inde-
pendent administrative body which adjudicates disputes arising from citations or pen-
alties imposed by OSHA. The OSHRC chairman appoints administrative law judges
(ALJs) who have life tenure and who hear the disputes and render decisions. Id.
124 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
125 Id. § 651(b)(5)-(7). This section calls for providing research in the area of occu-
pational health and safety; developing new and innovative methods for addressing
health problems; discovering latent diseases and establishing causal connections be-
tween diseases and work; and providing medical criteria to assure that no employee
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hazards, a measure intended to adjust to advances in science and
changes in industry practices, employer policies, and employment
conditions. The general duty clause was Congress’ attempt to hold
employers to the common law standard of general care to refrain
from actions causing harm to others and to encourage them to
reduce safety and health hazards at the workplace.126 While em-
ployers’ general duty of care under 5(a)(1) applies only to an em-
ployer’s own employees, an employer can be held liable for
hazards affecting its employees in workplaces not under that em-
ployer’s exclusive control.127
An employer violates the general duty clause when the OSHA
Secretary can prove “(1) that the employer failed to render its
workplace free of a hazard which was (2) recognized and (3) caus-
ing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm.”128 This gen-
eral duty requires employers to eliminate “feasibly preventable”
hazards.129 The Secretary must demonstrate, by specifying the par-
ticular steps that should have been taken, feasible and reasonable
measures that would materially reduce the likelihood of injury re-
sulting from the cited hazard.130 A safety measure is feasible when
safety experts determine it to be so and not when the precaution is
customary in the industry.131 A violation pursuant to the general
duty clause “does not require the actual occurrence of an accident,
nor does the occurrence of an accident, by itself, prove the exis-
tence of a violation.”132 Therefore, the inquiry turns on the likeli-
hood of an injury if an incident occurs rather than the likelihood
suffers diminished health, functional capacity, or life expectancy due to her or his
work experience.
126 Id. § 651(b)(1); see also Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Comm’n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court refers to the
House and Senate Committee reports on the Act that state the common law standard
of care was not one of reasonableness, but rather a standard of care based on a “gen-
eral and common duty to bring no adverse effects to the life and health of their em-
ployees throughout the course of their employment.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-
1291, at 21 (1970); and S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 9 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177, 5186). The court then states “[t]hat employers must take more than merely
‘reasonable’ precautions for the safety of employees follows from the great control
which employers exert over the conduct and working conditions of employees.” Nat’l
Realty, 489 F.2d at n.34.
127 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 202.
128 See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265.
129 Getty Oil Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1143, 1145
(5th Cir. 1976).
130 Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 593 F.2d
637, 640 (5th Cir. 1979).
131 See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266, n.37.
132 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 198.
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of an incident.133 The focus is then on the existence of hazardous
conditions rather than the occurrence of an accident. In this re-
spect, opponents of expanding the general duty clause to include
the prohibition of excessive work hours could not defeat such a
mandate by claiming that the causal connection between long
hours and a particular or likely injury is too attenuated.
The Act granted employees a certain bundle of rights which
were included to ensure the full effect of the general duty clause by
enabling employees to monitor and ensure enforcement of em-
ployers’ general duty requirement.134 Employees have, for exam-
ple, the right to request a workplace inspection because of an
imminently dangerous workplace condition or practice;135 to ac-
company OSHA inspectors during their workplace inspections;136
to be informed of their protections under the Act;137 to have access
to toxicity exposure reports conducted by employers;138 to refuse
work duties that would reasonably cause death or serious injury;139
to protection against retaliation;140 and to bring an action to com-
pel the Secretary of Labor to seek injunctive relief if the employee
believes the Secretary wrongfully declined to do so.141 While these
rights142 are limited either by statute or by case law, they indicate
133 The Duriron Company, Inc. 11 O.S.H. Cas. 1405 (BNA) (1983). Regarding the
meaning of “likely” in the general duty clause, the Commission reasoned: “However,
the Commission has held that the term “likely” in the general duty clause does not
refer to the likelihood of an incident occurring but to the likelihood of serious injury
in the event an incident occurs.” Id. at 1407.
134 Courts require OSHA to have administrative probable cause in order to obtain a
warrant to search an employer’s workplace based on an employee’s complaint of a
general duty clause violation. See Reich v. Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that, “[a] mere allegation of danger from an employee without suffi-
cient documentation or supporting data is insufficient; in order to establish ‘adminis-
trative probable cause,’ the warrant application must ‘support[ ] a reasonable belief or
lead[ ] to a reasonable suspicion that the OSH Act or its regulations have been vio-
lated.’” (citing In re Midwest Instruments Co., 900 F.2d 1150, 1153 (7th Cir. 1990))).
Such probable cause, the court found, “requires OSHA to perform a sufficient investi-
gation to confirm the validity of the complaint, for instance, interviewing the com-
plainant, interviewing other employees, checking medical records when possible, or
contacting the employer to allow it to explain and/or respond to the alleged unsafe
conditions.” Reich, 13 F.3d at 1166.
135 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (2001).
136 29 U.S.C. § 657(e).
137 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1).
138 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3).
139 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (2003).
140 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1).
141 29 U.S.C. § 662(d).
142 Generally, I believe that statutory rights of employees to police the workplace,
though important to a comprehensive remedial scheme, too often become the pri-
mary enforcement mechanism against employer misconduct, due to the abdication of
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that Congress, OSHA, and the courts recognize the Act’s “remedial
orientation is prophylactic in nature,” i.e., that its purpose is to
“prevent deaths and injuries from ever occurring.”143
2. OSHA’s Jurisdiction to Prohibit Excessive Work Hours
OSHA is authorized to prohibit excessive work hours because
the agency regulates employment performed in workplaces with re-
spect to the health and safety of employees if not preempted by any
other federal agency.144 The Act does, however, expressly contem-
plate preemption in 29 U.S.C. section 653(b)(1) by providing that:
[n]othing in this [Act] shall apply to working conditions of em-
ployees with respect to which other Federal agencies . . . exer-
cise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or
regulations affecting occupational safety and health.
OSHA will be preempted in cases where a statute, involving the
jurisdiction of another federal agency, is solely concerned with reg-
ulating the health and safety of workers or authorizes that agency
to regulate an aspect of public safety or health, and employees re-
ceive the statutory protection directly (as opposed to
incidentally).145
Section 4(b)(1) of the Act expressly prohibits OSHA from ex-
ercising its statutory authority when other federal agencies promul-
gate specific regulations regarding the working conditions at issue
or assert comprehensive regulatory jurisdiction over working con-
ditions of employees.146 In Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling, the Su-
preme Court held that “mere possession by another federal agency
of unexercised authority to regulate certain working conditions is
government responsibility to inspect, monitor, and enforce the law. Indeed, it is hypo-
critical to prioritize employees as the lead watchdogs vis-a`-vis workplace health and
safety when the Act itself emerged out of the need to protect employees deemed “ill-
equipped” to ensure workplace health and safety. Therefore, one primary purpose in
reinvigorating the general duty clause is to strike a more effective and fair balance
between employers’ and employees’ obligations under the Act. While advocating with
and on behalf of workers to “know their rights” with regard to occupational health
and safety is important, this can never be allowed to substitute for government en-
forcement of employers’ affirmative obligations to employees pursuant to the Act.
Otherwise, employees are asked to police workplaces in the absence of full knowl-
edge, equal bargaining power, and effective enforcement mechanisms.
143 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12 (1980).
144 29 U.S.C. § 653(a) (limiting the scope of OSHA’s authority to employment per-
formed in a workplace). To the author’s knowledge, there has never been a citation
or worker claim contending that long work hours violates the general duty clause.
145 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 23-24.
146 See Chao v. Mallard Bay Drilling. Inc., 534 U.S. 235, 244 (2002).
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insufficient to displace OSHA’s jurisdiction.”147 The court further
reasoned that:
minimal exercise of some authority over certain conditions . . .
does not result in complete pre-emption of OSHA jurisdiction,
because the statute also makes clear that OSHA is only pre-
empted if the working conditions at issue are the particular ones
‘with respect to which’ another federal agency has regulated,
and if such regulations ‘affect occupational safety or health.’148
Therefore, although some industries may regulate work hours,
thus possibly preempting an OSHA work-hours standard in that in-
dustry, there is no federal statute that has occupied the field for
workers generally.
There is no precedent within OSHA’s existing regulatory re-
gime that could be used to justify the prohibition of excessive work
hours. However, the standard used in industries where workers are
exposed to lead, constitutes recognition that working more than
eight hours can lead to overexposure and therefore requires em-
ployers to adjust the permissible exposure limit (PEL) based on
the number of hours worked.149 This means that if employers can-
not reduce the PEL to an acceptable level, the employer is re-
quired to implement engineering, administrative, or work practice
controls to reduce the PEL.150 The regulation even contemplates
temporary removal of employees due to elevated blood-lead
levels.151 Thus, there is already a willingness to require employers
to adjust work hours when they exceed the normal eight-hour day,
forty-hour workweek and place workers’ health and safety at
greater risk.
B. Legislative History of OSHA and the General Duty Clause
The legislative history of the Act is ambiguous with regard to
the intent behind the general duty clause. This is in part because
147 Id. at 241 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1)).
148 Id.
149 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c) (2003). This section states:
(1) The employer shall assure that no employee is exposed to lead at
concentrations greater than fifty micrograms per cubic meter of air
(50 µg/m3) averaged over an 8-hour period.
(2) If an employee is exposed to lead for more than 8 hours in any
work day, the permissible exposure limit, as a time weighted aver-
age (TWA) for that day, shall be reduced according to the following
formula: Maximum permissible limit in (µg/m3) = 400 ÷ hours
worked in the day.
150 29 C.F.R. at § 1910.1025(e)(1)(i).
151 29 C.F.R. at § 1910.1025(k)(1)(i).
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Congress did not consider the Act in its final form until after the
Senate and House bills were finalized in the Conference Commit-
tee Report.152 Specifically, the general duty clause was redrafted
and amended.153 Both the Joint House-Senate Conference and the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare committees, however, recognized
the common law bases of the general duty concept.154 For instance,
the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee recognized the
common law basis for the Act in the general duty of care and sim-
ply regarded the Act as extending to employers the same degree of
care defined as “this general and common duty to bring no adverse
effects to the life and health of their employees throughout the
course of their employment.”155 Federal and state laws also existed
to provide employees with a safe and healthy workplace.156
The Supreme Court, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, which up-
held workers’ right to refuse to do a job that presents an immedi-
ate danger of death or serious injury, emphasized the preventative
nature of the Act.157 The Court cites examples from the legislative
record where the members of Congress referred to the prevent-
ative purpose of the Act and the “tragedy of each individual death
or accident.”158 Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart recited the
declaration of Senator Yarborough, a sponsor of the Senate Bill,
who reminded his colleagues that:
[w]e are talking about people’s lives, not the indifference of
152 For a discussion regarding the legislative intent behind the general duty clause,
see NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, Crisis in the Workplace: Occupational
Disease and Injury in TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 183
(Nicholas A. Ashford, ed.) (Island Press, 1996).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 184.
155 Id.; see also, S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 9 (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177,
5186, where the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported:
The committee has concluded that such a provision is based on sound
and reasonable policy. Under principles of common law, individuals are
obliged to refrain from actions which cause harm to others. Courts
often refer to this as a general duty to others. Statutes usually increase
but sometimes modify this duty. The committee believes that employers
are equally bound by this general and common duty to bring no adverse
effects to the life and health of their employees throughout the course
of their employment. Employers have primary control of the work envi-
ronment and should insure that it is safe and healthful. Section 5(a), in
providing that employers must furnish employment “which is free from
recognized hazards so as to provide safe and healthful working condi-
tions,” merely restates that each employer shall furnish this degree of
care.
156 ASHFORD & CALDART, Crisis, supra note 152, at 184.
157 Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12 (1980).
158 Id. at 12, n.16; see also, Am. Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H.C. 1596 (1981).
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some cost accountants. We are talking about assuring the men
and women who work in our plants and factories that they will
go home after a day’s work with their bodies intact.159
Justice Stewart’s analysis of the legislative history of the Act placed
the right to refuse to work OSHA regulation in the context of the
general duty clause. Specifically, he argued that section 1977.12
gave “appropriate aid to the full effectuation of the . . . ‘general
duty’ clause.”160 In fact, a House Committee Report recognized the
danger of employees who may be economically coerced into self-
exposure to earn a livelihood.161 Although this comment was made
in the context of the “strike with pay” provision which was later
deleted, the acknowledgement that the Act’s purpose is to protect
employees from coercive employer practices that led to hazardous
working conditions was not lost on members of Congress.162
The Act’s legislative history illuminates the distinction be-
tween hazards in employment and hazards in place of employment as
discussed in the introductory remarks of this article. In American
Cyanamid Co., the Occupational Health and Safety Review Commis-
sion addressed what constituted a condition of employment,
whether that condition had to occur within the workplace to fall
within the Act, and which conditions of employment constituted a
hazard within the meaning of the Act.163 The case focused on
whether an employer’s fetal protection policy violated the Act
when female employees, in order to comply with the policy and
maintain their jobs, underwent surgical sterilizations outside the
workplace.164
The Commission seems to have held that employee compli-
ance with an employer policy constitutes a condition of employ-
ment within the meaning of the Act as long as the policy operates
directly upon the employee in the workplace while working.165
Based on the legislative history, the Commission found that Con-
gress had not contemplated such a policy as falling within the
scope of the Act because the policy did not operate directly upon
employees engaged in work or work-related activities.166 In addi-
159 Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at 12 n.16 (citation omitted)
160 Id. at 12. See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (providing employees with the right to
refuse work under hazardous conditions that will reasonably cause death or serious
injury).
161 Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at 14 n.20.
162 Id. at 16.
163 See Am. Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H.C. at 1600.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See id.
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tion, the Commission distinguished between temporary labor
camp conditions, which do bear a direct relationship to employ-
ment and therefore fall within the Act, from the fetal protection
policy, which does not.167 The Commission determined the “deci-
sion to undergo sterilization . . . grows out of economic and social
factors which operate primarily outside the workplace [and which]
the employer neither controls nor creates as he creates or controls
work processes and materials.”168 The Commission deemed the fe-
tal protection policy as neither a work process nor work material,
finding that the policy did not “alter the physical integrity of em-
ployees while they are engaged in work.”169 Therefore, the Com-
mission reasoned that, although Congress
intended to protect employees from reduced functional capacity
as a result of the work experience . . . it does not follow that the
general duty clause applies to an employment policy whose
physical impact on employees is indirect and derives not from
work processes and materials but from social and economic fac-
tors outside the workplace.170
167 See id. n.23.
168 Id. But see Richard Lewis, Comment, OCAW v. American Cyanamid: The Shrinking
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 133 U. PA L. REV. 1167, 1179 (June 1985)
(arguing that “it is nonsense to characterize a policy designed, implemented, and
enforced by the employer as external to the workplace”).
169 Am. Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H.C. at 1600.
170 Id.
Congressional floor debates, committee reports, and individual and mi-
nority views reported in the legislative history are replete with discus-
sions of air pollutants, industrial poisons, combustibles and explosives,
noise, unsafe work practices and inadequate safety training, and the
like. The effects on employees which Congress hoped to alleviate are
described in general terms such as accident, disease, industrial injury,
reduced life expectancy, crippling, maiming, disablement and death,
and in specific terms such as cancer, allergy, heart disease, respiratory
impairment, chemical poisoning, burns, broken bones, and the like. Re-
peated reference is made to the fact that congressional action with re-
gard to occupational safety and health received its impetus from the vast
numbers of on-the-job injuries and deaths reported each year. In the
words of Congressman Anderson, “the worker’s surroundings and the
conditions under which he works are of crucial importance in the whole
environmental question for it is in this environment that he spends one-
third of his day. The air he breathes and the tools and materials he
handles can pose a direct threat to his health, safety, and well-being if
adequate precautions are not taken. This is really what we are talking
about today in considering the need for national industrial health and
safety standards.” From this it is clear that Congress conceived of occu-
pational hazards in terms of processes and materials which cause injury
or disease by operating directly upon employees as they engage in work
or work-related activities.
Id. at 1599-1600 (internal citations omitted).
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The Review Commission thus rejected the secretary of labor’s argu-
ment that “any condition of employment which can ultimately re-
sult in reduced functional capacity is a hazard within the meaning
of the general duty clause.”171 The Commission’s decision was later
upheld in an opinion by Judge Bork of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals (hereinafter “OCAW”).172 The court held that the general
duty clause applied to hazards resulting from the physical condi-
tion of the workplace that employees are exposed to during their
daily tasks.173
Although one commentator interprets Bork’s decision to ex-
clude employer policies from the scope of the general duty clause,
a close reading of his decision does not support such a view.174 It is
true that Judge Bork, at one point in his opinion, excludes em-
ployer policies generally from the general duty clause;175 however,
in other instances in which he discusses the employer policy at is-
sue, he favorably refers to the Commission’s decision which did not
preclude employer policies per se from coverage under the Act.176
The Commission limited its holding to employer policies that “can-
not alter the physical integrity of employees while they are engaged
in work or work-related activities.”177 Certainly, it cannot be said
171 Id. at 1600.
172 Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
173 Id. at 448.
174 See Lewis, supra note 168, at 1170-1174 (arguing that Judge Bork erroneously
used precedent, congressional intent, and policy to limit employer liability and
thereby misconstrued the Act).
175 Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d at 448 (“It follows,
therefore, that the general duty clause does not apply to a policy as contrasted with a
physical condition of the workplace.”).
176 Id. at 445, 447, 449; see also Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. 1596, 1599 (1981)
(“We agree with CRROW that it is employee implementation of the policy that is at
issue here and to that extent the policy is a condition of employment within the
meaning of the Act.”).
177 Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Am. Cyanamid Co. at 445, 447, 449. Specifically,
Bork, quoting from the Commission’s decision, writes: “ ‘[t]the fetus protection pol-
icy,’ by contrast, does not affect employees while they are engaged in work or work-
related activities. The decision to be sterilized ‘grows out of economic and social fac-
tors which operate primarily outside the workplace,’ and hence the fetus protection
policy ‘is not a hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause.’” Id. at 447. “We
agree with this conclusion. Were we to decide otherwise, we would have to adopt a
broad principle of unforeseeable scope: any employer policy which, because of em-
ployee economic incentives, left open an option exercised outside the workplace that
might be harmful would constitute a “hazard” that made the employer liable under
the general duty clause. It might be possible to legislate limitations upon such a prin-
ciple but that is a task for Congress rather than courts. As it now stands, the Act
should not be read to make an employer liable for every employee reaction to the
employer’s policies. There must be some limit to the statute’s reach and we think that
limit surpassed by petitioners’ contentions.” Id. at 449.
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that an employer’s policy can never alter the physical integrity of
employees while engaged in work. In fact, the American Cyanamid
decisions in both the lower and D.C. Circuit did not disturb the
finding that temporary labor camp conditions,178 policies that pro-
vide for the temporary removal of workers with elevated blood lead
levels from jobs involving lead exposure,179 travel to and from the
worksite,180 and prophylactic chelation drug therapy used to re-
duce blood lead levels,181 were properly within the scope of the
Act. OCAW/American Cyanamid upheld OSHA’s regulatory authority
over these conditions of employment even though they involved a
policy or affected workers outside the workplace because they all
bore a “direct relationship” to the workers’ employment.182
It has been argued elsewhere that mere silence on the part of
Congress with regard to whether employer policies are within
OSHA’s jurisdiction does not indicate a Congressional intent to ex-
clude intangible hazards from the scope of the Act.183 Thus, while
the legislative history is not conclusive and the American Cyanamid
reasoning by both the Commission and Judge Bork is muddled,
there is sufficient basis to argue that regulation of excessive work
hours is distinguishable from the fetal protection policy and there-
fore within the Act’s scope as a condition of employment that can
alter the physical integrity of employees engaged in work.
Though initially the meaning of the provision “recognized
hazards” in the general duty clause was debated, its legislative in-
tent is now well-settled. During House debates, Representative Wil-
liam Steiger argued that “recognized hazards” applied only to
those hazards which could be detected by the human senses.184
However, Representative Steiger’s argument was rejected by the
OSHRC and the federal courts. A recognized hazard is now under-
stood to mean a hazard that is common knowledge within the em-
ployer’s industry or a hazard where the employer had actual
knowledge of the hazardous condition or practice.185 In its Compli-
ance Operations manual, OSHA establishes its interpretation of
the recognized hazard standard. The Manual states:
178 See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.142.
179 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k).
180 Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 4 O.S.H.C. 1320 (1976).
181 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(j)(4)(i).
182 Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. 1596, 1599 (1981).
183 Lewis, supra note 168, at 1174.
184 Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 501
F.2d 504, 509 (1974).
185 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 204.
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[a] hazard is “recognized” if it is a condition that is (a) of com-
mon knowledge or general recognition in the particular indus-
try in which it occurs, and (b) detectable (1) by means of the
senses (sight, smell, touch and hearing) or (2) is of such wide
general recognition as a hazard in the industry that even if it is
not detectable by means of the senses, there are generally known and
accepted tests for its existence which should make its presence known to
the employer.186
In American Smelting and Refining Co., the Eighth Circuit upheld the
OSHRC’s position, stating that non-obvious hazards were contem-
plated by the Act.187 The court adopted a broad interpretation of
the recognized hazards provision of the general duty clause, con-
cluding that a narrow interpretation would endanger the purpose
and intent of the Act—protecting workers’ health.188 The court
found it significant that Congress changed “readily apparent
hazards” to “recognized hazards.”189 Another court has recognized
that actual knowledge of the hazardous condition by the employer
satisfies the recognized hazard clause.190
The Act’s legislative history has been construed to strip em-
ployers of the common law defenses of contributory negligence,
fellow servant negligence, and assumption of risk.191 Although em-
ployers are not held strictly liable but are only required to elimi-
nate feasibly preventable hazards, the Act clearly sought to
intervene in the employment relationship so as to ensure that em-
ployers no longer controlled employees to the degree that workers
suffered diminished health, functional capacity, and life expec-
tancy as a result of the work experience.192 Indeed, Commissioner
Burch’s assessment of the legislative history indicated that it was
intended to retire conceptions of master and servant in the em-
ployment relationship and to “supersede and remove . . . vestiges
of the industrial revolution from the field of occupational safety
and health.”193
186 ASHFORD & CALDART, Crisis, supra note 152, at 184 (quoting OSHA’s Compliance
Operations Manual).
187 Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 501
F.2d 504, 511 (1974).
188 Id. at 511.
189 Id.
190 Brennan v. OSHRC, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974).
191 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co., Inc., 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 16548, *6 (1972).
192 29 U.S.C. § 651(7) (2000).
193 Nat’l Realty, 1 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at *6.
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C. Current Federal Regulation of Work Hours in Certain Industries
The federal government recognizes the relationship between
long work hours and diminished health and safety. In fact, during
the 1990s, the Department of Transportation (DOT) spent more
than $30 million researching the effects of fatigue.194 Departments
within DOT are reportedly “in the process of proposing new hours-
of-service regulations, developing fatigue countermeasures, and
forging partnerships with industry and labor to collaboratively
study work-hour issues.”195 In 1989, the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) made recommendations to the DOT “to in-
vestigate fatigue and its relation to safety, to educate transportation
industry workers on work and its relation to health, and to revise
current hours-of-service regulations to maximize the safety of its
workers and the people they serve.”196 The NTSB has issued more
than seventy fatigue-related safety recommendations to the DOT
since 1989.197
Currently, the federal government regulates work hours in sev-
eral industries, including highway, aviation, railroad, and maritime
industries.198 All of these industries fall within the jurisdiction of
the DOT or one if its departments. For instance, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) prohibits pilots from flying more than
thirty-hours per week or eight-hours in a single day.199 The Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) limits drivers in
commercial industries, such as truck and bus drivers, to a maxi-
mum of eleven driving hours or fourteen-hours on-duty following a
minimum of ten-hours off-duty.200 Significantly, in discussing the
process by which the revised hours of service regulations were de-
veloped, the FMCSA reports the crucial role that sleep research
and studies of fatigue and driver performance played in formulat-
ing the standards.201 Operators in the railroad and maritime indus-
tries are regulated by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
Although less strict, the FRA regulations limit work hours to four-
teen-hours within a twenty-four-hour period and require a ten-hour
194 See Petition, supra note 66.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 For the revised hours of service regulations issued by FMCSA in April 2003, see
Federal Register, Hours of Service of Drivers, 68 Fed. Reg. 81, 22456 (Apr. 28, 2003) (to
be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 385, 390, 395), available at http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/
Home_Files/hos/hos_reg.pdf.
201 See id. at 22459.
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rest period following twelve hours of work.202
D. Case Law Interpreting the General Duty Clause Supports Overwork
as Falling Within the Provision’s Purview
This section will address some likely arguments against read-
ing the general duty clause more expansively than it has previously
been read so as to include the regulation of work hours within its
mandate. First, the general duty clause is safety legislation that is
construed liberally by federal courts in order to effectuate Congres-
sional purpose.203 Moreover, the rules of progressive construc-
tion204 dictate an interpretation of the Act, and the general duty
clause specifically, which includes long work hours as within
OSHA’s scope of regulatory authority. Long work hours are a haz-
ard that, although not a circumstance specifically addressed in the
legislative history or the case law thus far, is substantially compara-
ble to the hazards actually contemplated by Congress.205 Despite
the government’s recognition of the hazards of long work hours as
demonstrated by the regulation of work hours in some industries,
OSHA’s authority to regulate this hazard through inspection, cita-
tion, and enforcement pursuant to the Act has been compromised
as a result of the narrow scope given to the general duty clause.
1. Employment and Place of Employment
As noted in the introduction, section 5(a)(1) requires employ-
ers to ensure that the employment and the place of employment
are free from recognized hazards. While some courts fail to distin-
guish between “employment” and “place of employment” in their
reasoning, there is case law concerning conditions of employment
as it pertains to an employer’s general duty under the Act which
suggests that a distinction is recognized.206 Moreover, Congress’ in-
tention that a distinction be made is based on the well-settled rule
202 See Petition, supra note 66.
203 See Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (citing United States v. An
Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969); Lilly v. Grand Trunk W.R.R. Co.,
317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943)).
204 “A statute can operate prospectively so as to include circumstances unknown at
the time of enactment . . . where the language of the statute, as illuminated by legisla-
tive history and other extrinsic aids, can be read fairly to include the unforeseen cir-
cumstances.” Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. 1596, 1600 (1981).
205 Id. (“Whether an unforeseen circumstance can be read fairly to fall within the
ambit of a particular statute depends not only on policy considerations, but on
whether that circumstance is ‘substantially comparable’ to those actually contem-
plated by Congress.”)
206 See generally Am. Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H.C. 1596 (1981); Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. 1.
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of statutory construction that effect must be given, if possible, “to
every clause and word of a statute.”207 Thus, the contention made
here is that the general duty clause contemplates long working
hours as a recognized hazard since it is a condition of employment.
Remembering the reasoning in American Cyanamid Co. (the
employer fetal protection policy case), the OSHRC held that, al-
though the sterilization policy was a condition of employment
within the meaning of the Act, Congress did not intend the Act to
extend to “every conceivable aspect of employer-employee rela-
tions.”208 The Commission concluded therefore that the steriliza-
tions that plaintiff female employees underwent to keep their jobs
was an employment condition with “unique characteristics” which
did not constitute a hazard within the meaning of the general duty
clause. In order to reach this conclusion, the Commission sought
to distinguish between employer policies that directly caused
hazards and those that indirectly caused hazards. Not surprisingly,
the fetus protection policy fell in the latter category.
Opponents may argue that long work hours similarly consti-
tute a “unique characteristic” outside the purview of the Act. How-
ever, the reasoning of American Cyanamid supports the contention
that long hours are a condition of employment that directly affects
employees and that the regulation of hours is within the control of
employers, thus surviving the American Cyanamid standard. First,
long work hours are either mandated or permitted by the em-
ployer and therefore constitute an employment condition con-
trolled by the employer. Second, long work hours operate directly
upon employees engaged in work or work-related activities by com-
promising employee work performance and functioning or em-
ployee health. Moreover, long work hours, as an employer-
controlled employment condition, operating directly upon em-
ployee work activities, function, like air-quality or temperature, as a
work process that causes injury or disease. Long work hours there-
fore: (1) are controlled by the employer, and (2) directly alter the
physical integrity of the employee engaged in work. Thus, existing
precedent is not disturbed by OSHA exercising regulatory author-
ity over excessive work hours.
2. Free From Recognized Hazard
The “free from recognized hazards” provision of the general
duty clause serves an important due process function. It gives em-
207 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
208 Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. at 1598.
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ployers fair notice of the conduct they must avoid, conditions they
must prevent, and hazards they must eliminate. To be a recognized
hazard the alleged hazardous condition or practice must be pre-
ventable and either be a subject of common knowledge within the
employer’s industry or actually known to the employer. Nothing in
the case law suggests that long work hours per se are inconsistent
with the meaning of recognized hazard. However, this aspect of the
general duty clause may prove to be a more difficult obstacle to
OSHA exercising its regulatory authority over excessive workplace
hours. First, the preventability requirement has proven difficult to
overcome as the OSHRC has construed this standard to permit em-
ployers to escape liability under the general duty clause for “indus-
trial activities [which] are dangerous by nature, involving risks
inherent in the conduct of business.”209
Opponents could apply this reasoning to long work hours and
argue that mandatory overtime is an essential job function and
therefore is a risk incident to the business.210 However, a plaintiff
could show that long work hours, even if an essential job function,
is not a risk incident to the business, like typing or loading boxes
onto trucks, because it does not constitute a normal occupational
task, but rather a work process or policy. To be sure, this aspect of
the general duty clause involves a public education campaign on
the negative effects of long work hours as much as it does a compli-
cated legal strategy.
A good deal of effort is required to: (1) convince safety experts
to include reduced work hours as part of their recommended
safety programs and (2) as a way to develop the requirement of
common knowledge, raise public awareness that reducing work
hours can materially reduce the likelihood of work-related injuries.
Once safety experts deem reduced work hours as a “necessary and
valuable” component of any employer safety program, then the ob-
jective determination of common or actual knowledge by the em-
ployer will more likely be satisfied.211 An important aspect of
raising public awareness is for the scientific and academic commu-
209 Kolesar, supra note 30, at 2095 (“To permit the normal activities in . . . an indus-
try to be defined as a ‘recognized hazard’ within the meaning of [the general duty
clause] is . . . almost to prove the Secretary’s case by definition, since under such a
formula the employer can never free the workplace of inherent risks incident to the
business.”) (quoting Pelron Corp., 1986-1987 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶27,605, 35,872
(June 2, 1986)).
210 This argument has already gained acceptance in the courts. See generally Davis v.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).
211 Kolesar, supra note 30, at 2093.
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nity to study and disseminate research across all industry and occu-
pational sectors, which identifies a threshold level at which long
work hours becomes hazardous.
3. Feasibility of Abatement Measures
OSHA must also show the feasibility of abatement measures,
i.e., what the cited employer should have done to reduce the risk
of harm.212 Analysis of the feasibility of preventing hazards in viola-
tion of the general duty clause was first outlined in National Re-
alty.213 Under National Realty, the court looks at various factors to
determine the feasibility of an employer’s preventative measures. It
will consider the judgment of safety experts and whether they
would account for the hazard in designing a safety program.214 Idi-
osyncratic or implausible hazardous conduct is not considered pre-
ventable, and employers are not obliged to adopt untested or
prohibitively expensive measures that experts would agree are in-
feasible.215 However, the court qualified the scope of what it con-
sidered feasible and therefore preventable, stating that general
industry-wide usage is not required and that expense does not
render a measure infeasible.216 The court suggested that in cases
where the measure threatens an employer’s economic viability, the
Secretary “should propose the precaution by way of promulgated
regulations, subject to advance industry comment, rather than
through . . . the general duty clause.”217 The Secretary must show
that “demonstrably feasible measures would have materially re-
duced the likelihood that such misconduct would have oc-
curred.”218 Although the courts have not precisely defined the
parameters of the feasibility requirement with regard to abatement
methods, there is considerable acceptance of the National Realty
analysis.219
A major challenge to establishing long work hours as a feasibly
preventable hazard is proving that an employer can comply with
212 Id. at 2096.
213 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 489
F.2d 1257, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
214 Id. at 1266.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1297.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1267.
219 See, e.g., Beverly Enters., Inc., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1161, 121 (Oct. 27, 2000);
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1993, *160 (Apr. 26, 1997); Champlin
Petroleum Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th
Cir. 1979).
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the work hours regulation without jeopardizing long-term profit-
ability and competitiveness and that if such precautions prove
costly, the employer can pass any burdensome cost-increase on to
the consumer.220 These are two primary factors in determining
whether the costs of compliance are economically feasible. How-
ever, it would be a heavy burden for employers to show that reduc-
tion in hours was not feasible and that therefore noncompliance
could not be prevented, thereby relieving them of liability. In es-
sence, an employer would have to show that long hours were neces-
sary in order to remain in business. Indeed, some pro-employer
case law suggests such an argument could prove successful.
In Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., the 11th Circuit did rule
in an anti-retaliation discrimination suit that overtime was an “es-
sential job function” and justified the employer’s termination of
the plaintiff for refusing to work the overtime.221 Using Davis, the
employer could argue that since overtime is an essential job func-
tion, it is central to the maintenance of the business and long
hours are therefore not a feasibly preventable hazard. However,
even if the Davis reasoning is accepted by a court, it does not follow
that simply permitting an employer to mandate overtime for one
particular job position because it is essential transforms that over-
time work into a necessary condition for the success of the em-
ployer’s entire business. Moreover, Davis could be challenged on
the policy grounds that Congress, in enacting FLSA, never in-
tended overtime to become an essential job function as it was de-
signed as a premium penalty to discourage employer use of
overtime, particularly when the long hours endanger the health of
employees.
Another likely challenge to the feasibility of reducing work
hours is the argument that it is impossible to determine exactly
when long hours become hazardous or at what threshold work
hours are likely to cause death or serious injury.222 But this argu-
220 Sec’y of Labor v. Waldon Healthcare Ctr., 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1052, 1063
(Apr. 2, 1993) (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Walker Towing Corp., 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
2072, 2077 n.9 (Feb. 15, 1991)).
221 See generally Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2000).
222 In fact, this argument initially had success in the fight by employers to evade the
general duty clause with regard to repetitive or cumulative trauma disorders associ-
ated with ergonomic hazards. See Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken, supra note 58,
at 117-18. However, in 1997, OSHA announced that ergonomic hazards were viola-
tions under the general duty clause. See OSHA Rev. Comm’n, Commission Decides Ergo-
nomics Hazards Citable Under the “General Duty Clause,” Apr. 28, 1997, available at
OSAHRC LEXIS 1997. This change in policy was the result of the Pepperidge Farm
decision in which the OSHRC held that abatement of ergonomic hazards could be
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ment confuses the difficulty in defining the threshold of the recog-
nized hazard with the feasibility of abating the hazard. Establishing
a hazard as recognized and feasibly preventable within the mean-
ing of the general duty clause does not require knowledge of the
precise threshold at which the work process or material becomes
hazardous. Rather, to establish feasibility, the Secretary must only
show that demonstrably feasible measures would have materially re-
duced the likelihood of injury caused by the hazard, i.e., such as
preventing long hours and either hiring more workers or introduc-
ing new technology to maintain current productivity levels. Moreo-
ver, even if excessive hours are determined to be only a
contributory factor, reducing work hours still constitutes a feasible
precautionary measure. Aside from the fact that employers must be
given fair notice to comply with the free-of-recognized-hazards pro-
vision of the clause, the Secretary does have authority, as indicated
in Pepperidge Farm, to require an employer to embark upon a pro-
cess of abatement when actual injury causally related to the hazard
has been demonstrated, even when the threshold level of the haz-
ard is unknown.223 As Pepperidge Farm reasoned, “the existence of a
hazard is established if the hazardous incident can occur under
other than a freakish or utterly implausible concurrence of
circumstances.”224
The feasibility analysis in section 5(a)(1) is similar to section
5(a)(2) cases concerning OSHA’s standard-setting authority. The
required under the general duty clause. Pepperidge Farm, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at
*160.
223 See, e.g. id. at *79, *81, *165. Courts generally uphold subsequent citations
against an employer if the hazard is defined with sufficient specificity to give the em-
ployer fair notice that it or the industry recognizes the process or material as a hazard.
Therefore, the Secretary would not be required to define the threshold over which
work hours becomes hazardous since actual injuries can be scientifically linked to
long hours. For instance, in Pepperidge Farm, the OSHRC reasoned that:
[t]he inability to quantify a threshold may be of great significance when
there is little evidence that the putative hazard may cause injury to
humans, or where the question is whether it should be presumed that
the risk should be controlled to the full extent feasible. It is of less sig-
nificance where, as here, human injury is allegedly manifest. Thus,
where substantial injury is actually occurring, neither precedent nor
common sense require that the finding of hazard be foresworn until
there is determination of the threshold at which there occurs a substan-
tial risk of injury.
Id. at *81. Another case, Kastalon Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, in which the
court found that “[n]one of the physicians or scientists who testified could identify a
safe level of exposure to VCM, nor the precise mechanism by which it produces can-
cer; yet expert after expert recommended that this ‘very virulent’ carcinogen be re-
stricted to the lowest detectable level.” 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975).
224 Pepperidge Farm, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at *80.
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general rule courts use to determine the economic feasibility of a
standard is that it cannot threaten the entire industry’s long-run
profitability or competitiveness, but an individual firm that is
forced out of business as a result of the costs of compliance will not
defeat the standard.225 The courts have generally held that OSHA
may impose standards on employers and industries regarding
health and safety, but that they must be economically feasible.226
Such a cost-benefit standard reduces worker health and safety to a
commodity subject to market forces and erroneously presumes
health and safety can be optimized as a bargained-for condition.227
Nevertheless, the industry-wide analysis required by the economic
feasibility standard will make it difficult for employers to prove pro-
hibition against long hours threatens profitability and competitive-
ness. Moreover, research shows that, despite employer practices
pointing to the contrary, reducing overtime or work hours does
not necessarily result in lower production levels.228 Therefore, ap-
plying the general duty clause to instances of excessive work hours
does not contravene this economic feasibility standard.
4. Cause or Likely to Cause Death or Serious Injury
To establish a general duty clause violation, the hazard must
also cause or likely cause death or serious injury. The causal con-
nection between the workplace condition and the physical harm
must be determined to be plausible229 and the physical harm seri-
ous, i.e., harm in which a body part is rendered “functionally use-
less” or is “substantially reduced in efficiency.”230 The first part of
the test is rather easily met, though opponents would likely try to
distort the required causal connection–arguing the test should be
the likelihood of injury due to long hours, rather than the likeli-
225 See Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1978); AFL-CIO
v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodg-
son, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
226 Typically, employers will challenge standards that require significant new costs
in order to maintain compliance. Regulating work hours—in theory—should be no
different, since it will negatively impact profit margins and raise employer costs of
doing business.
227 See generally NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW
AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 229-258 (Island Press, 1996).
228 See, e.g., Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 221.
229 Waldon Healthcare, 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1060 (1993) (“[T]he existence of
a hazard is established if the hazardous incident can occur under other than a freak-
ish or utterly implausible circumstances.”) (quoting Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v.
OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
230 Kolesar, supra note 30, at 2100 (citing OSHA, Revised Field Operations Manual
IV-21 (1989)).
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hood of injury if an accident occurs.231 As for the second part of
the test, long work hours, as discussed above, can lead to occupa-
tional fatalities, musculoskeletal and cumulative trauma disorders
as well as stress, fatigue, sleep deprivation, and impaired perform-
ance which can lead to various health problems, including heart
attacks, high blood pressure, and cardiovascular disease. There-
fore, a plaintiff working long hours could plausibly claim that such
overwork could lead to serious physical injury or death.
5. Whirlpool’s Relevance to OSHA’s Regulation of Work Hours
Although an expanded OSHA mandate that would prohibit
excessive work hours would give the OSHA Secretary the authority
to demand abatement measures from employers to correct or elim-
inate the hazard of long work hours, it should also permit workers
themselves the right to refuse to work under such conditions. Such
an OSHA regulation already exists and has been upheld by courts.
The case that will most inform OSHA and the judiciary’s response
to workers’ right-to-refuse authority stemming from an OSHA man-
date to prohibit excessive work hours is Whirlpool.232 In Whirlpool,
the Supreme Court upheld C.F.R. section 1977.12 which grants
employees the right to refuse to work under hazardous condi-
tions.233 The decision demonstrates that the Act was designed to
prevent injuries and death even if it meant workers walking off the
job in order to protect their safety and health.234 The Court con-
231 See The Duriron Company, Inc. 11 O.S.H. Cas. 1405, 1410 (BNA) (1983) (Row-
land, Chm., dissenting).
232 See generally Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
233 Id.
234 For a critical analysis of the judiciary’s limitations on the right-to-refuse provi-
sion, see Gordon, supra note 41, at 539 (noting the extent to which the right-to-refuse
provision has been limited by case law). Gordon states,
Employees in the United States have a right to refuse unsafe work in
cases where the employee has a reasonable belief that performance of
the work constitutes an imminent danger of death or serious physical
injury. This has proven to be a strict standard that is rarely met by the
employee. The employee has the burden of showing a reasonable belief
under the circumstances and that the action was taken in good faith as
“any employee who acts in reliance on the regulation runs the risk of
discharge or reprimand in the event a court subsequently finds that he
acted unreasonably or in bad faith.” More importantly, the regulation
“does not require employers to pay workers who refuse to perform their
assigned tasks in the face of imminent danger,” but an employer must
offer the employee other available work. In practice, the employee is
forced to choose to either remain at a task while exposed to a substan-
tial risk of harm, or be without work for a period of time until the dis-
pute is resolved. An employee in these circumstances has little incentive
to refuse unsafe work because the slim chance of proving the reasona-
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strued the so-called self-help regulation as fully effectuating the
general duty clause by giving employees the right to refuse and
protection against discriminatory retaliation for such refusal to
work in dangerous conditions. The Court believed such protection
necessary to supplement the monitoring of OSHA inspectors who
cannot be in all workplaces at all times.235
The Whirlpool decision established that employers cannot sub-
ject employees to work conditions the employee believes represent
a reasonable risk of danger of death or serious injury.236 The Court
clearly placed the health and safety of employees over that of unfet-
tered employer power to subject workers to unsafe conditions. Sig-
nificantly, the Court dismissed Whirlpool’s argument that a
worker’s unilateral authority to refuse hazardous work was tanta-
mount to authority to shut down the employer’s plant. The court
found the right-to-refuse provision to be “a permissible gloss on the
Act” and was satisfied that a worker’s authority to refuse hazardous
work was adequately balanced by the threat of discharge for acting
in bad faith.237 However, renewed focus on this provision will be
important if workers are to effectively avail themselves of OSHA
protection against long hours. Therefore, based on Whirlpool and
the legislative intent of the Act, the general duty clause appears to
place limits on an employer’s extraction of labor when those work
hours become excessive and put the worker at risk of injury or ill-
ness, even when it results in lost production time and loss of em-
ployer profits.238
bleness of the belief in court does not outweigh the greater potential for
lost pay.
Id.; see also Gross, supra note 27, at 382 (commenting on the right-to-refuse limitation,
and concluding that “[t]he dominant values here, of course, are the maintenance of
employer control and authority at the workplace and a fear and distrust of workers’
motives.”).
235 Whirlpool, 445 U.S. at 13.
236 Id. at 21.
237 Id. at 12, 21.
238 Opponents of an expanded OSHA mandate will argue that, in Whirlpool, the
court appeared to give weight to Congressional concerns over giving federal officials
unilateral authority to temporarily shut down plant operations in situations of immi-
nent danger because it would impair an employer’s business without judicial safe-
guards (due process considerations) and it “might jeopardize the Government’s
otherwise neutral role in labor-management relations.” See id. at 21. They will likely
contend that authority to reduce work hours is tantamount to such an administrative
shut-down power. However, the issue of unilateral authority of a federal agency and its
agents was not at issue in Whirlpool, only a worker’s right to refuse hazardous work
conditions, so this Congressional concern did not figure in the holding. In any case,
authority to reduce work hours is not comparable to authority to shut down plant
operations.
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Opponents of OSHA exercising its regulatory authority in the
area of work hours may argue that Whirlpool and section 1977.12
only permit an employee to walk off the job for health and safety
reasons after the “employee has sought from his employer, and
been unable to obtain, a correction of the dangerous condi-
tion.”239 The implication is that section 1977.12 itself is a work
hours regulation and such a regulation, as contemplated by the
Act, can only be triggered in emergency situations created by em-
ployer non-responsiveness. That is, section 1977.12 is triggered as a
consequence of an uncorrected hazard as opposed to the circum-
stance of long work hours which is itself the hazard. Regulating
work hours for safety reasons seeks to prevent a violation and does
not entail an employee refusing to work because of an already-ex-
isting employer-imposed uncorrected hazard. Therefore, an em-
ployer may argue that a worker who refuses to perform a
dangerous task may be blocked from protection under section
1977.12 if there was a reasonable and less drastic alternative availa-
ble. However, the limitations on this worker self-help provision can-
not be used to deny OSHA authority to prohibit excessive work
hours. This interpretation confuses the hazard with the response to
the hazard.
IV. EXISTING LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO REGULATE WORK HOURS
AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING WORKER HEALTH AND SAFETY
A. Current and Past Legislation Linking Long Hours to Safety and
Health Hazards
1. Federal Legislation
There is Congressional movement on the issue of legislating
limits on mandatory overtime, although the proposed bills only
cover licensed health care workers such as nurses. In March 2001,
Representative Tom Lantos introduced H.R. 1289, known as the
Registered Nurses and Patients Protection Act, that would amend
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to prohibit mandatory over-
time for licensed health care workers. The bill would prohibit em-
ployers from requiring an employee to work more than eight hours
in any workday or eighty hours in any fourteen-day work period
except in the case of a state of emergency. In November 2001, Rep-
resentative John Conyers introduced HR 3236, the Patient and
Physician Safety and Protection Act of 2001, which would limit resi-
dent physician work hours to eighty per week and no more than
239 29 C.F.R. §1977.12(b)(2) (2003); Whirlpool, 445 U.S. 1.
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twenty-four per shift. The bill recognizes that “excessive hours
worked by resident-physicians lead to higher rates of medical error,
motor vehicle accidents, depression and pregnancy.” A more limit-
ing proposal was the Safe Nursing and Patient Care Act of 2001
which was introduced in both houses and would amend the Social
Security Act to limit the mandatory overtime hours of nurses reim-
bursed under the Medicare program.
2. State Legislation
A few states have sought to prohibit mandatory overtime for
wage-earning employees.240 The most important proposed bill
prohibiting mandatory overtime was introduced by Assem-
blywoman Cathy Nolan of New York in 2001.241 The Bill is signifi-
cant because it prohibits mandatory overtime in the context of the
overhaul of the state workers’ compensation system, which is
plagued with delays and low benefit rates.242 Thus, the Bill explic-
240 See GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4, at 11-14 for a general discussion of state
legislation regarding overtime.
241 A.B. 8260 2003-04 Reg. Assem. Sess. (N.Y. pending). The relevant provisions of
the Bill, contained in section 3, state,
Mandatory overtime prohibited.
1. As used in this section, unless the context otherwise indicates, “over-
time” means the hours worked in excess of forty hours in a calendar
week.
2. An employer may not require an employee to work overtime.
3. An employer shall not retaliate or discriminate against an employee
for refusing to work overtime. An employer shall not coerce an em-
ployee to work overtime.
4. Any person or corporation that violates this section is guilty of a mis-
demeanor. A repeat offender, who has violated this statute twice, is
guilty of a felony. In addition, an employee whose rights are violated
by the statute shall be entitled to a private right of action that in-
cludes damages equal to fifty dollars for the initial hour that the em-
ployee was forced to work and one hundred dollars for each
additional hour forced to work in violation of this statute. An em-
ployee whose rights are violated by this statue shall also be entitled to
punitive damages and attorneys fees for such a claim.
242 This legislation was developed in 2001 by the It’s About Time! Campaign for
Workers’ Health and Safety. This campaign is led by injured workers fighting to over-
haul the New York State workers’ compensation system and to give more control to
working people over their time, health, and lives. In New York, the Workers’ Compen-
sation Board (WCB) uses systematic delays and other strategies to discourage, intimi-
date, and frustrate workers who are filing claims. These tactics result in reductions in
employer workers’ compensation premiums and increasing profits for insurance com-
panies, both of which help the state attract new business. Ultimately, WCB policies
reward employers for the sweatshop conditions they create and profit from while
transferring the costs of employer-created hazards onto the workers themselves and
the taxpayers, as injured workers are forced to utilize public assistance programs be-
cause of the delays and unfair case closures that occur in the workers’ compensation
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itly connects workplace injuries to the long working hours employ-
ees are forced to work. The Bill as a whole also gives workers an
independent right to be free from mandatory overtime.243 Specifi-
cally, it protects workers from discrimination or retaliatory action
for such refusal.244 It does not limit the prohibition to hourly work-
ers, but applies to all workers. The Bill does not prohibit voluntary
overtime. Washington Senate Bill 6120 prohibits mandatory over-
time for all hourly workers, but permits voluntary overtime work
and overtime worked by salaried workers. West Virginia proposed a
similar statute in H.B. 2018 that prohibited employers from man-
dating overtime for hourly workers and included a provision giving
workers the right to refuse overtime work.
Some states have or have recently proposed statutes that limit
mandatory overtime for workers generally. Maine limits the
mandatory overtime hours an employer can require to no more
than eighty hours in any consecutive two-week period.245 Salaried
and seasonal employees, medical interns and residents, and em-
ployees performing essential public services are exempt from the
restriction. Interestingly, the statute provides a form of a “right to
refuse work” to nurses by prohibiting disciplinary action against
them by employers who demand more than 12 consecutive hours
of work. Other states have proposed more restrictive limits on the
overtime hours an employer can mandate. For example, New York
Senate Bill 160 restricted an employer’s ability to demand overtime
to no more than ten hours of overtime per week without written
consent of the employee. Pennsylvania House Bill 428 would give
employees the right to refuse work in excess of eight hours of over-
time per week. However, another bill, HB 1253, would ensure an
employee’s right to refuse overtime in excess of eight hours by pro-
tecting the employee against retaliatory firing.
In 2001, legislation in many different states proposed prohibi-
tions against or limitations on mandatory overtime for health work-
ers.246 Connecticut’s proposed Senate Bill 5698 would prohibit
context. Nat’l Mobilization Against Sweatshops, It’s About Time! Campaign for Work-
ers’ Health (2001) at http: //www.nmass.Org /nmass /wcomp/workerscomp.html
(on file with the New York City Law Review).
243 A.B. 8260 2004-04 Reg. Assem. Sess. (N.Y. pending).
244 Id. at § 3(A)(3).
245 26 M.R.S. § 603 (2003).
246 In New York, the legislature amended the health code in 1989 limiting medical
residents to an eighty-hour workweek averaged over a four-week period, but despite
some citations issued by the Department of Health and surviving a legal challenge
from the Hospital Association of New York, the provisions are largely ignored by hos-
pitals and suffer from a culture of compliance on paper, but violation in practice.
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mandatory overtime for hourly health care workers. Bills in New
Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin would prohibit licensed heath care fa-
cilities from requiring employees to work more than eight hours
per day or forty hours per week. Hawaii’s Senate Bill 62 would pro-
hibit employers from mandating nurses to work more than forty
hours per week or “longer than the number of hours regularly
scheduled for a particular workday.”247 New York Senate Bill 1380
proposed limiting the on-duty hours of nurses to sixteen hours per
day or sixty hours per seven-day period. New York Senate Bill 3515
would restrict on-duty hours to no more than eight per day, forty
hours per week. California Senate Bill 1027 proposed prohibiting
mandatory overtime for nurses beyond eight hours in one workday
or forty hours in one workweek, except under natural or state-de-
clared emergencies. However, this bill exempted voluntary over-
time. Nevertheless, the bill’s sponsor Senator Gloria Romero
argued that the legislation’s purpose was to address the dangers of
overtime for nurses and patients as well as the shortage of nurses in
the state.248 Unfortunately, although a version of the bill passed
both houses, Senator Romero has put this bill on her inactive list as
of 2003.
As of late 2002, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ore-
gon, and Washington had legislation limiting mandatory overtime
applicable to nurses. Generally, these laws limit the overtime an
employer can mandate by either: (1) expressly giving the worker
the right to refuse overtime or by providing the worker protection
from discrimination or retaliation for refusing to work overtime;249
or by (2) prohibiting employers from requiring overtime250 or
scheduling employees beyond their pre-determined or regularly
scheduled hours.251 Minnesota’s statute252 appears only to give
nurses the right to refuse overtime when it endangers patients’
health, while Maryland does not explicitly prohibit overtime but
Dori Page´ Antonetti, Comment, A Dose of Their Own Medicine: Why the Federal Govern-
ment Must Ensure Healthy Working Conditions for Medical Residents and How Reform Should
be Accomplished, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 875, 888-89 (2002).
247 GOLDEN & JORGENSEN, supra note 4 at 11.
248 Press Release, California Nurses Association, Assembly Passes Bill to Bar
Mandatory Overtime for Nurses (Sept. 13, 2001) at http://www.calnurse.org/cna/
press/91301.html.
249 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26 § 603(5) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a34(b) (West
Supp. 2003).
250 OR. REV. STAT. § 441.166(2) (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.28.140 (West
2002 & Supp. 2003).
251 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(b) (Supp. 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-
56a34(a) (West Supp. 2003).
252 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.275 Subd. 2 (West Supp. 2003).
2004] OVERWORK ROBS WORKERS’ HEALTH 137
only hours beyond the “regularly scheduled hours according to the
predetermined work schedule.”253 Strangely enough, overtime is
regarded by many of these statutes as hours above twelve hours per
day rather than the normal eight.254 Moreover, most of the statutes
provide an exemption to the mandatory overtime regulation in
cases of unforeseeable emergent circumstance or emergency:255
where the employer makes reasonable efforts to avoid the overtime
hours;256 where the employee voluntarily consents to such over-
time;257 where the overtime is necessary to complete a procedure
in progress and the employee’s absence could adversely affect the
patient;258 or where a special category of health care worker is in-
volved such as an on-call,259 community-based care nurse,260 or cer-
tain assisted-living facility or nursing home employees.261
In September 2002, California Governor Grey Davis vetoed a
law that would have strengthened protections for workers who re-
fused to work under unsafe working conditions and were retaliated
against by their employers.262 Significantly, the bill allowed workers
the right to file civil actions against employers who retaliated
against such employees and subjected employers to possible fines
and misdemeanor convictions for such discriminatory actions.263
Although this bill did not recognize long work hours as an unsafe
253 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(b) (2002).
254 This is the case under the statutes of Maine, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington,
and possibly Maryland.
255 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 603(5) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.275
(3) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(c) (2003); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 441.166(3) (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a34(c)(2) (West 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.28.140(3)(a) (West 2003).
256 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(c) (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-
56a34(c)(2) (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.28.140(3)(c) (West 2004).
257 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56a34(b) (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.28.140(2) (West 2004).
258 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.28.140(3)(d) (West 2004).
259 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(d)(1) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-
56a34(c) (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.28.140(3)(b) (West 2004).
260 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-421(d)(2) (2003).
261 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.275 (West Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-
56a36(b) (2002).
262 See Official California Legislative Information, Bill Information, available at http:/
/www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/asm/ab_2751-2800/ab_2752_bill_20020928_
history.html.
263 A.B. 2752 2001-02 Reg. Assem. Sess. (CA vetoed). The relevant provisions of the
Bill, contained in Section 3(d)(1), state:
For purposes of this section, “refused to perform unsafe work” means a
refusal to perform work she or he reasonably believed to be unsafe or
dangerous, created a real and apparent hazard, or was likely to cause
death or serious physical harm to the employee, her or his fellow em-
ployees, or the employees of another employer.
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working condition, its definition of such a condition could be con-
strued as including long work hours.
In sum, the scope of state laws prohibiting or limiting
mandatory overtime is limited to nurses or health care workers.
Their efficacy in preventing workplace injuries and illnesses is fur-
ther diminished by numerous exceptions and the fact that they
generally permit “voluntary” overtime. Moreover, the right of these
workers to be free from the long hours resulting from overtime is
weakened by the language of the statutes. That is, the statutes may
not explicitly prohibit employers from mandating overtime but
merely give employees protection against discriminatory retaliation
for refusing to work long hours. In addition, in the case of many of
the statutes the overtime prohibition is not triggered until after a
worker has worked a 12-hour day. Other statutes exempt employers
from complying with the prohibition against mandating overtime
in the event that a worker consents to the overtime or reasonable
efforts are taken by the employer to avoid the need for mandatory
overtime. Regrettably, the full implications of these provisions will
not be known until a court interprets them.
B. Regulation of Work Hours in Foreign Countries
The European Union (EU) appears willing to contemplate
and enforce a more expansive worker health and safety regime.
The European Council (hereinafter “Council”) passed Council Di-
rective 93/104/EC, or the Working Time Directive (hereinafter
“Directive”), in November 1993.264 The Directive was based on arti-
cle 118a of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which en-
couraged member states to improve the “working environment”
with regard to health and safety of workers.265 The Council’s Direc-
264 1993 O.J. (L 307) 0018-0024.
265 See The European Council, The Treaty on European Union, available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/health_safety/intro/art118a_en.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2004) (on file with the New York City Law Review) (stating:
[a]rticle 118a of the TEU reads in relevant part:
(1) Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging im-
provements, especially in the working environment, as regards the
health and safety of workers, and shall set as their objective the har-
monization of conditions in this area, while maintaining the im-
provements made.
(2) In order to help achieve the objective laid down in the first para-
graph, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission, in cooperation with the European Parlia-
ment and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee,
shall adopt by means of directive, minimum requirements for grad-
ual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical
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tive placed significant limits on work hours and expressly linked
work hours to health and safety. The Directive mandated that every
worker: (1) receive a minimum of eleven consecutive hours of rest
per twenty-four-hour period with a rest break for work days longer
than six hours; (2) be given a minimum of one twenty-four-hour
uninterrupted rest period per seven day work week; and (3) enjoy
an average workweek of forty-eight hours (calculated over a four-
teen-day period) and a minimum of four weeks paid annual leave.
The Directive also recognized the special health hazards that ac-
company extensive work in the areas of shift and night work and
therefore authorized regulatory action with regard to the amount
and patterns of work in these areas.266
When the United Kingdom (UK) challenged the Council’s
broad interpretation of article 118a, the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Communities (ECJ), in United Kingdom v. EU Council,
agreed with the Council and interpreted article 118a expansively.
Ironically, the United Kingdom had initially scoffed at the Direc-
tive as an hours-spreading strategy and did not realize its implica-
tions for domestic health and safety regimes because it deemed its
own health and safety laws as superior to those on the continent.267
The U.K. argued that article 118a’s “working environment” meant
only the physical space of the workplace. However, the ECJ re-
jected this narrow definition of health and instead held that article
118a embraced “all factors, physical or otherwise, capable of affect-
ing the health and safety of the worker in his working environ-
ment, including in particular certain aspects of the organization of
working time.”268 Thus, the ECJ defined health according to the
World Health Organization’s preamble to its constitution, which
states that health is “a state of complete, physical, mental and social
well-being that does not consist only in the absence of illness or
infirmity.”269 In an advisory opinion, Advocate General Leger con-
tended that the Danish origins of “working environment” included
non-traditional measures of health and safety such as work
rules obtaining in each of the Member States. Such directives shall
avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a
way which would hold back the creation and development of small
and medium sized undertakings.).
266 Greg A. Friedholm, Note, The United Kingdom and European Union Labor Policy:
Inevitable Participation and the Social Chapter Opportunity, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
229, 236 (1999).
267 Id. at 236-37.
268 Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 C.M.L.R. 671, 710 (1996); see also
Friedholm, supra note 266, at 238.
269 Friedholm, supra note 266, at 238.
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hours.270 The ECJ therefore found that “a sufficient nexus existed
between the regulation of working hours and employee health and
safety so as to fall within the scope of article 118a.”271
Significantly, many European countries had annual limits on
overtime hours prior to the Directive coming into force. For in-
stance, as of 1992, Spain limited its annual overtime hours to
eighty, France to 130,272 Greece to 150, Portugal to 160, and Ire-
land to 240 hours.273 Moreover, the Directive does not attempt to
reconcile these variations in annual limits on overtime hours man-
dated by the various countries, but it does require any overtime
hours to be included in the calculation of the 48-hour work-
week.274 These annual limits are an important safeguard for work-
ers’ health and safety since the 48-hour workweek is merely an
average calculated over a 14-day period and therefore does not
function as a real maximum.275 For example, under the Directive’s
11-hour rest requirement per 24-hour period, a worker could still
work five13-hour days in one week totaling a 65-hour workweek as
long as she worked a 30-hour workweek the following week.276
Thus, the Directive stops short of imposing a supranational maxi-
mum workweek.277 This is largely due to: (1) the Directive’s author-
ity arising from the basis of worker health and safety articulated in
article 118a, rather than the explicit objective to anchor the provi-
sion in a worker autonomy/work hours maximum perspective, and
(2) the competing EU policy of ensuring employer flexibility and
competitiveness, as is the case in the United States.278
Thus, the ideological currency of employer flexibility is
equally persistent in the EU and has ensured that derogation and
even an opt-out from the Directive’s article six forty-eight-hour av-
eraged maximum workweek is possible and expected.279 Indeed,
270 Id. at 238 n.80.
271 Id. at 239.
272 Craig S. Smith, Shortened Workweek Shortens French Tempers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2003, at A3. In 2000, France passed a thirty-five-hour standard workweek law. How-
ever, the motivation for the shorter workweek appears to have been a work-spreading
initiative designed to lower high unemployment which had reached 13%.
273 See LINDER, AUTOCRATICALLY FLEXIBLE, supra note 11, at 403.
274 Id. at 403-404. Linder faults the Directive for masquerading as a health and
safety provision when in fact its real impetus was to serve a work-spreading function.
275 Id. at 406.
276 See id. at 402.
277 Id. at 406.
278 Id. at 404.
279 Id. at 406-407. For instance, Linder points out that the Directive exempts trans-
portation workers and authorizes a reference period of up to four months during
which the average of forty-eight-hour weeks can be set. Id. at 406.
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this technique of limiting overtime based on averaging workweek
hours over multiple weeks or even months already exists in the laws
of several EU member states.280 Most alarming is France’s working
time law that phases in a thirty-five-hour law and caps annual over-
time work hours at 130, but does not include within this calcula-
tion voluntarily worked overtime.281
Recent changes in the overtime laws in Ontario, Canada also
demonstrate that employer flexibility is repeatedly privileged over
workers’ health and safety. In July 2000, the Legislative Assembly
enacted a working time law that allowed employers to work em-
ployees up to sixty hours per week and beyond in excess of the
eight-hour, forty-eight-hour workweek, contingent upon employee
consent and governmental approval.282 Moreover, an employer
may escape the overtime premium penalty normally triggered at
forty-four hours if the employee does not work more than 176
hours over a four-week period.283 Thus, an employer can now work
an employee up to sixty hours in one week without paying any
overtime premium. In addition, the law permits employers to re-
quire employees upon hire to sign an agreement consenting to
averaging, thus effectively waiving their right to overtime premium
pay.284 Prior to the 2000 working time law permitting a sixty-hour
workweek averaged over three weeks, the eight-hour day, forty-
eight-hour week maximums had been consistently evaded by em-
ployers who applied for government-issued permits authorizing
longer workweeks. This is a permissible practice sanctioned under
the Employment Standards Act of 1944.285 Significantly, Linder
notes that right-to-refuse overtime provisions in the Ontario law
have proven inaccessible to overworked, non-unionized Canadian
workers, and only have been accessible to unionized workers as in-
dividuals.286 Interestingly, Canadian employers argued that deregu-
280 Id. at 409-12. For instance, the German Working Time Law of 1994 states that
“daily working time may not exceed eight hours, but it permits a ten-hour day, pro-
vided that the average workday does not exceed eight hours over a period of six calen-
dar months or twenty-four weeks,” whereas the Netherlands’ “Working Time Law of
1996 provides for a maximum shift of nine hours and a maximum workweek of forty-
five hours so long as these hours do not exceed an average of forty hours per week
during a period of thirteen weeks.” Id. at 409. Spain, Italy, and France also have work-
ing time laws that make stated maximums easy to evade. Id. at 410-11.
281 Id. at 411.
282 See id. at 434.
283 Id. at 435.
284 Id. at 434-437.
285 Id. at 420-27.
286 Id. at 445-6 and 459. Linder concludes:
The right to refuse to work overtime, as the example of more than a
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lation of hours and greater employer flexibility were necessary in
order to compete with U.S. capital.287
The Ontarian and French working time laws illustrate how in-
effective caps on overtime are when they do not impose real limits
on employers’ ability to force workers to work long hours. Right-to-
refuse work laws and policies, either within the legal regimes of
health and safety or hours regulation, are inadequate devices to
halt employer use of long work hours when it is employers who
have the ability to set (i.e., lower) wages, thus making overtime ef-
fectively mandatory. These laws, as well as the averaging methods
used by many EU states and by the Directive, represent failed at-
tempts at effective prohibitions against long work hours, and
demonstrate the raw power and currency that the ideology of em-
ployer flexibility enjoys in the Western world. Nevertheless, the Di-
rective does represent an advance over current U.S. health and
safety laws in that it at least recognizes (1) the connection between
long work hours and worker health and safety, and (2) considers
work hours to be within the realm of working conditions and there-
fore an appropriate regulatory domain that can promote worker
health and safety.
V. DEFINING AN EXPANDED OSHA MANDATE
A. The General Duty Clause Revisited
In today’s economy, characterized by the dramatic reorganiza-
tion of production, employers are increasingly using overtime as a
form of hazard pay. Overtime complements other employer-cre-
ated, labor-cost-reducing tactics that have the overall effect of shift-
ing the costs of poor working conditions onto workers. Clinical and
epidemiological research exists linking long work hours to work-
related injuries and illnesses. Federal agencies regulate work hours
for health and safety reasons while workers’ compensation systems
half-century of experience in Ontario demonstrates, is not an unam-
biguously positive instrument of achieving a normal working day or
week. Because the laissez-faire underpinnings of the right to say no are
inextricably linked to the right to say yes, its libertarianism not only
makes it possible for workers to become complicit in the race to the
bottom that compulsory labor norms are designed to prevent, but also
makes effective enforcement against employers intent on using subter-
fuges to transmogrify coercion into consensualism difficult and some-
times impossible. These perverse outcomes should be contrasted with
the operation of an absolute maximum-hours law, which is designed to
create an ‘overwhelming societal obstacle’ to such transgressions.
Id. at 460.
287 Id. at 414.
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deem stress due to overwork a compensable injury. While there will
certainly be opposition to the idea, legislative history, the plain
reading of the general duty clause, and the subsequent case law
interpreting its scope all support an expanded OSHA mandate reg-
ulating excessive work hours. Furthermore, rules of statutory con-
struction and case law suggest that OSHA and the courts can read
the general duty clause to encompass the regulation of excessive
work hours as a recognized hazard even though it was not a type of
hazard initially imagined by the legislators who enacted the Act
more than thirty years ago.288 In American Smelting and Refining Co.,
the court justified its finding that non-obvious hazards were con-
templated by the Act by concluding that a broad interpretation of
the general duty clause was crucial if the Act were to give adequate
protection to workers.289
The Act sought to extend to employers the duty of care “to
bring no adverse effects to the life and health of their employees
through the course of their employment.”290 The essential goals of
the Act were: (1) to relieve workers of the double bind of choosing
between their health and their job; (2) to rebalance the unequal
bargaining power of workers vis-a`-vis their employers; and, as the
general duty clause explicitly states, (3) to place affirmative obliga-
tions on employers to provide safe and healthy employment and
places of employment.291
With regard to the first goal, courts have already construed
OSHA to prohibit an employer from forcing workers to choose be-
tween their health and their job.292 In Whirlpool, the Court upheld
section 1977.12, which gives workers, at least in theory, the right to
protect their health and safety by refusing to work under danger-
ous conditions.293 The Court upheld the anti-retaliation provision
288 See Am. Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H.C. 1596 (1981).
289 Am. Smelting & Refining Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 501
F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974).
290 Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (quot-
ing R. Rep. No. 91-1291, Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 21
(July 9, 1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (Oct. 6, 1970)).
291 See Lewis, supra note 168, at 1177. “Legislative history and judicial precedent
indicate that the OSH Act is intended to prohibit employers from forcing workers to
choose between their health and their jobs.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1291, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1970); ). “The district courts have sanctioned an employer’s right
to make workers choose between their jobs and their lives. We cannot agree that the
statute was ever intended to require placing an employee in such an untenable posi-
tion.” Id. at 1178 (citing Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 1979),
aff’d, 445 U.S. 1 (1980).
292 See generally Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. at 13.
293 Id. at 22.
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prohibiting employers from discriminating against workers who
avail themselves of protection under section 1977.12.294 Thus,
these rights could realistically be triggered when an employer at-
tempts to subject a worker to overtime, a second shift, or holdover
when such work places the worker in immediate danger of death
or serious injury.
With no alternative, a worker’s right in such a situation would
presumably trump an employer’s right to require performance,
even at the expense of the employer’s output or production de-
mands. Although by itself the right to refuse overtime (if OSHA
were to deem long hours a recognized hazard) may not provide
adequate worker protection, as similar provisions in Ontario have
gone under-utilized, Whirlpool’s section 1977.12 is still useful if it
can give workers a basis to keep their job and health while seeking
protection against the coercive practices of an employer. There-
fore, Whirlpool’s interpretation of section 1977.12 and the general
duty clause stands for the proposition that worker health and safety
can be prioritized over employer’s autocratic flexibility to maxi-
mize productivity and profitability.
By giving workers as well as OSHA inspectors authority to curb
employers’ use of excessive hours, an expanded OSHA mandate
represents one step in rebalancing the unequal bargaining power
between workers and employers. Even the conservative rulings
from the OSHRC and Judge Bork in American Cyanamid Co. do not
disturb the notion that a condition of employment, including an
employer policy that operates directly upon workers and reduces
their functional capacity, is a hazard within the meaning of the
general duty clause. Taking the unilateral authority to set work
hours away from employers in recognition of how such power de-
prives workers of their health and safety gives working people a
new way to fight for control over their lives.
In addition, an expanded OSHA mandate that prohibits exces-
sive work hours places an affirmative obligation on employers to
prioritize the health and safety of their workers over the benefits of
lean production and the new labor supply regime which have re-
sulted in workers being forced to work long hours. Proponents of
employer autocratic flexibility will likely use American Cyanamid and
Davis to preclude employer liability for an employer policy that ef-
fectively functions as a mandatory condition of employment, but
such arguments should be fairly easily discounted and those cases
distinguished. In essence, where employment conditions operate
294 Id. at 21.
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directly upon workers, precedent suggests that courts will hold that
workers cannot be held captive to employer practices that place
them in danger.295 Therefore, employer fears of lost profits result-
ing from abatement measures that reduce work hours should
prove unavailing in courts, particularly when studies actually show
that reducing work hours can increase productivity.
Safety experts play an important role in substantiating the
claim that long work hours is a workplace hazard and feasibly pre-
ventable. While it is doubtful that a significant number of health
and safety experts currently incorporate long work hours into their
health and safety programs, or recommend to employers that they
reduce excessive work hours, or view long hours as the sole cause
of work-related injury or illness, there is general acceptance that
long hours constitute a contributing factor to work-related injuries
and illnesses.296 As a contributory factor, many experts view long
hours as hazardous, but are less likely to view this hazard as rising
to the level of a 5(a)(1) violation.297 However, Bill Kojola of the
AFL-CIO believes there are some people (in the health and safety
field) who would now classify long hours as a hazard, since stand-
ing alone, excessive hours have been linked to increased risk of
work-related injuries and illnesses.298 Therefore, it is not unforesee-
able that safety experts would take into account the hazard of ex-
cessive hours when prescribing a safety program and view the
precaution of reducing work hours as a feasible method to abate
the hazard.
New research, looking at work-related injuries and illnesses
within the context of how work is organized, has exposed the
hazards associated with lean, flexible work arrangements.299 Such
findings characterize the new labor supply regime as a consolida-
295 See generally Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1; Am. Cyanamid, 9 O.S.H.C.
1596 (1981).
296 This assessment is based on informal conversations the author had during the
fall of 2003 with several health and safety practitioners while doing research for this
article, among them Tom Broderick, Executive Director, Construction Safety Coun-
cil., and Bill Kojola, Industrial Hygienist, Safety and Health Department, AFL-CIO.
297 Telephone interview with Tom Broderick, Executive Director, Construction
Safety Council (Oct. 17, 2003) in which Broderick observed that “while you can get a
fair number of health and safety experts to say that working long hours in the heat or
cold [or in conjunction with bad elements or some other contributory working condi-
tion] is hazardous, it would be difficult [to get a significant number to say] that work-
ing long hours as a stand-alone hazard rises to the level of a general duty clause
violation.”
298 Telephone Interview with Bill Kojola, Industrial Hygienist, Safety and Health
Department, AFL-CIO (Oct. 21, 2003).
299 See generally NIOSH, supra note 8.
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tion of employer autocratic flexibility and the maximization of pro-
duction and profit. Numerous studies have shown that reducing
work hours can reduce the risk of injury and illness resulting from
overexertion, exhaustion, fatigue, stress, and accidents due to im-
paired functioning. One study in particular encouraged employers
not to work employees over forty hours per week as the risk of in-
jury and illness greatly increased after that many hours of work. In
support of this study, a German study found the accident rate rose
exponentially after the ninth hour of work.300 Another study found
that the injury rate increased by 50% across all workers beyond a
fifty-hour work week, which corresponds to the findings of other
experts who set the threshold level at which work hours become
hazardous.301 It would take a certain kind of boldness, not uncom-
mon among employers and proponents of employer flexibility, to
argue that compliance with the spirit of the FLSA’s forty-hour
workweek and with OSHA’s duty of care to protect worker health
and safety is prohibitively expensive and thus infeasible. However,
it is quite another matter for employers to convince safety experts
that reducing such long work hours is not feasible.
In fact, a primary goal of the NORA is to address the health
and safety ramifications of the changing organization of work. One
area of research identified by NORA is the link between the in-
crease in working time and its adverse impact on worker health
and safety,302 particularly with regard to remedies for the hazard of
long work hours.303 NORA’s 2002 report stated that “an urgent
need exists to implement data collection efforts to better under-
stand worker exposure to organizational risk factors for illness and
injury, and how these exposures may be changing.”304 Inevitably,
opponents attempting to derail an expanded OSHA mandate to
prohibit excessive work hours will argue that long hours alone can
never rise to the level of a recognized hazard.305 This effort to con-
fuse the causal connection necessary to establish a violation of the
general duty clause should not be legitimized by multivariable re-
search that confuses or underestimates the relationship between
excessive hours and worker health and safety. Thus, while future
300 See Golden & Jorgensen, supra note 4, at 3 and accompanying text.
301 Dong, supra note 32; Spurgeon et al., supra note 25.
302 NIOSH, supra note 8, at 12.
303 Id. at 20.
304 Id. at vi.
305 Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 370, 372. The authors speculate that other
variables, such as personality type (e.g., competitiveness), determine a worker’s sus-
ceptibility to working excessive hours and that it is the personality type which influ-
ences the greater risk of health problems. Id. at 372.
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research should consider more than the stand-alone role of exces-
sive hours, multivariable studies, which are nothing more than dis-
guised attempts to sabotage a work-hour regulation, should not be
allowed to drive such research or case law.
More studies identifying the threshold level at which long
work hours become a hazard in particular industries, occupations,
and work environments are certainly needed to give OSHA and
judges the basis to uphold general duty clause violations for exces-
sive work hours. Once the research identifies trends, it will be eas-
ier for inspectors to defend their citations. To be sure, existing
studies demonstrate that serious injury or death is a plausible con-
sequence of working excessive hours. Moreover, these studies indi-
cate that long hours can substantially reduce the efficiency of, or
render functionally useless, a worker’s body part. Therefore, it is
reasonable for OSHA to conclude from existing research that re-
ducing work hours is a feasible precaution and can materially re-
duce the likelihood of a serious injury or death resulting from the
hazard of excessive work hours.
B. Making Sense of the Existing and Proposed Legislation and Foreign
Country Regulation of Working Hours
Recent proposed federal legislation and existing state laws lim-
iting work hours do not adequately reflect the Act’s goals of pro-
tecting worker health and safety and therefore do not provide
useful guidance to formulating an OSHA standard regulating work
hours. A few states have proposed legislation that would prohibit
mandatory overtime, but permit voluntary overtime.306 Consensual
overtime, right to refuse, and anti-retaliation provisions are insuffi-
cient to protect workers from long working hours when there is no
understanding on the part of working people of the dangers that
come with working excessive hours. While proposed federal legisla-
tion and state laws recognize the link between long work hours and
health, all but one are narrowly focused on nurses or health care
workers.307 Furthermore, the effectiveness of the current state laws
has been diluted because of the built-in loopholes employers can
use to evade the regulations that represent attempts to placate
powerful business interests.
306 See infra Part IV(A)(2) for a discussion of proposed state legislation.
307 The one exception is Maine’s law, which applies to workers generally, but which
caps overtime hours at a preposterous eighty hours over a two-week period–clearly
not a law designed to ensure worker health and safety. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. LABOR
AND INDUSTRY 26, § 603 (2004).
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Moreover, some of these proposed or existing laws, presuma-
bly in an effort to gain political and popular support for such regu-
lations, appear to be based more on the need to protect the health
and safety of the consuming public (which is at risk because of ex-
cessive work hours), rather than workers’ health and safety. Conse-
quently, these laws not only exclude too many workers but they
diminish the priority of protecting the health and safety of workers
as workers.308 While protecting public safety may be a legitimate
endeavor, consumer or product safety should not be accomplished
by way of worker health and safety regulation if one wishes to avoid
the latter being subordinate to the former.
Bias toward the interest of consumer protection is likely moti-
vated by many considerations, most of which can be traced to the
interests of capital. The inevitable result will be that this bias will
privilege the consumer over the worker. For instance, one problem
with conflating worker and public safety is the promulgation of
laws such as the Minnesota statute, which gives nurses the right to
refuse overtime only when it will not endanger a patient’s health.
The same is true for existing federal regulation of work hours in
certain transportation-related industries. That the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and its subordinate departments have regu-
lated the work hours of their employees for years demonstrates the
federal government’s acknowledgement of the detrimental effects
of long hours on worker safety and health. However, this instance
of governmental regulation reflects the fact that worker health and
safety is intimately connected to public safety in commercial indus-
tries. Moreover, regulating work hours to protect public safety in
the transportation industry, like the medical industry, is one key
way to avoid increases in insurance costs and lawsuits brought due
to human error. For instance, based on an Institute of Medicine
report which found that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die
annually due to medical error, the Department of Health and
Human Services spent $50 million to research ways to reduce medi-
308 See Antonetti, supra note 246, at 910. Antonetti faults the Petition, supra note 66,
for: (1) being concerned only with medical resident health and safety; (2) designating
OSHA as the enforcement agency because OSHA has not demonstrated a commit-
ment to enforce the Act; and (3) not regulating work hours. I would argue that she
puts too much faith in compliance with work hours regulation when tied to federal
funding, particularly when the emphasis is on public health and safety. For an alterna-
tive perspective regarding which agency should be tasked with enforcement of worker
health and safety and what the consequences are when that enforcement authority is
given to the agency responsible for the quality of the product rather than the health
of the worker, see Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken, supra note 58.
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cal errors.309
Based on this review of proposed and existing work hours reg-
ulations at both the state and federal level, it is important that the
proposed regulation of work hours with the goals of protecting
worker health and safety should not distinguish between voluntary
and mandatory overtime and should not subordinate worker
health and safety to economic considerations. Accordingly, any
standard regulating work hours is more properly situated within
the jurisdiction of OSHA because it is charged with ensuring the
health and safety of workers, rather than the Department of Health
and Human Services, which is responsible for “improving the na-
tion’s health.”310
In the international context, the Directive and its subsequent
judicial interpretation in the ECJ, although problematic since it
still permits relatively long hours, is instructive in that it adopts the
World Health Organization’s expansive definition of health as well
as a liberal conception of the workplace environment that includes
working time. However, referencing the Directive and other Euro-
pean and Canadian work hour regulatory regimes still requires
caution. As previously discussed, many of these laws are informed
by the same ideologically and economically driven notions of em-
ployer-oriented flexibility exemplified by limiting overtime based
on averaging workweek hours over multiple weeks or even months,
or exempting voluntary overtime from regulation.
Whether in the international or domestic context, the prob-
lem with regulating work hours in the context of worker health
and safety is that the crafters of these regulations too often under-
estimate the power and control employers exert over workers in
terms of workers’ time and wages. The exemption of voluntary
overtime and the limitation of overtime by granting workers the
right to refuse such overtime both ignore the fact that so many
workers are forced daily to work overtime just to supplement their
low wages set by profit-maximizing employers. Therefore, any regu-
lation must recognize that workers should not be allowed to give
up their health and safety for either short-term economic gains or
simply for economic survival. After all, the purpose of the Act was
to eliminate the double bind faced by so many workers forced to
choose between their health and their job.
309 Antonetti, supra note 246, at 903-04.
310 Antonetti, supra note 246, at 912.
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C. Formulating an OSHA Policy Using the General Duty Clause to
Prohibit Excessive Work Hours
In fashioning a policy by which OSHA could use the general
duty clause to prohibit excessive work hours, it is important to ac-
knowledge the need for more research to bolster the argument
that excessive work hours require regulation in order to ensure
worker health and safety on the job. To be sure, the impact of ex-
cessive hours can be a contributing factor exacerbating other work-
place hazards. However, as long as hours are viewed as simply one
variable among many, and not a hazard in its own right, long work
hours will continue to constitute a serious impediment to worker
health and safety. Although more clinical and epidemiological re-
search is needed to better understand the relationship between ex-
cessive hours and particular work-related injuries and illnesses,311
there is sufficient supporting research to use the general duty
clause to cite employers for permitting excessive work hours and
for the Secretary of Labor to require employers to engage in an
abatement process including reduction in workers’ hours.312
Additional targeted research in this area can also be helpful in
expanding how we define a healthy workplace. The World Health
Organization considers health as “a state of complete, physical,
mental and social well-being that does not consist only in the ab-
sence of illness or infirmity.”313 As opposed to the narrow concep-
tions of a workplace put forth by Justice Bork and other U.S.
judges, the workplace must be re-elaborated as the working envi-
ronment in which a worker works or is caused to be placed during
the course of employment, and which should include the physical
or tangible and intangible space in which the worker finds herself
or himself as a result of her or his work duties.
Whether or not OSHA adopts this broader view of a healthy
workplace, an effective work hours regulation could still be based
on current legal understandings of a workplace and a workplace
hazard. Even as a contributing hazard, reducing excessive work
311 In Pepperidge Farm, the Review Commission found clinical and epidemiologi-
cal evidence as well as the incident rate to be important contributors to its holding
that the injuries in question were not only ergonomics hazards that violated the gen-
eral duty clause but were causally connected to the workplace. 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)
1993, *149 (Apr. 26, 1997).
312 See id., at *168 (“We conclude based on the entire record that here, where ac-
tual injury is present and substantial causation has been shown, the Secretary may
require Pepperidge to engage in an abatement process, the goal of which is to deter-
mine what action or combination of actions will eliminate or materially reduce the
hazard.”).
313 Case 84/94, United Kingdom v. Council, 3 C.M.L.R. 671, 710 (1996).
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hours could be a feasible abatement measure that safety experts
could recommend to employers to prevent work-related injuries
and illnesses. Moreover, although the threshold at which work
hours becomes excessive may vary by industry, occupation, gender,
age, and a range of environmental stressors in a particular work
setting, research indicates that a cautious threshold of beyond fifty
hours per week is reasonable.314
As a general rule, excessive work hours should be prohibited
because it constitutes an employer-created and employer-con-
trolled condition of employment and policy that operates directly
upon workers as they engage in work or work-related activities
which can cause serious injury or death. It would therefore be in-
cumbent upon employers to provide employment free of the rec-
ognized hazard of excessive work hours. This may even include
sending a worker home who shows up to work straight from a sec-
ond job in which she or he worked a full eight or twelve-hour shift.
In Japan, a part-time employee was found to have died from
overwork, which is evidence that there should be no exemptions
for non-standard classes of workers, such as temporary, part-time,
contingent, contract, casual, or home-based workers.315 This ex-
pansive coverage is necessary in light of the “feast or famine” pre-
dicament in which many U.S. workers find themselves due to the
economic insecurity and job instability that characterize today’s
economy. Therefore, OSHA’s mandate must reflect current worker
realities of overwork and include underemployed workers who may
at certain times in the year work excessive hours in anticipation of
unemployment or a worker or additional family member who must
increase work hours to maintain current household income levels.
In fact, OSHA’s interpretation of the Act already contemplates
an expansive definition of employment as it relates to a worker’s
right to refuse to work under hazardous conditions and protection
against retaliation.316 Moreover, OSHA requires employers who ex-
314 Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 371.
315 Man’s Death Acknowledged as Stemming from Overwork, supra note 95. Significantly,
the court in a worker’s accident compensation case acknowledged the employee’s
death was from overwork as a result of accumulated fatigue due to excessive work,
even though the decedent had only worked for the employer for 52 days as a part-
time employee. Id.
316 29 C.F.R. § 1977.5 (2003). The statute in relevant part states:
Persons protected by section 11(c).
(a) All employees are afforded the full protection of section 11(c). For
purposes of the Act, an employee is defined as “an employee of an
employer who is employed in a business of his employer which af-
fects commerce.” The Act does not define the term “employ.” How-
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pose workers to a hazard, even if they do not create the hazard, to
disclose the danger to its workers and take reasonable alternative
protective measures.317 This broad coverage is necessary particu-
larly in light of the growing numbers of non-standard categories of
workers in today’s new economy. Employers use these new work
arrangements to evade liability for labor violations and lower labor
costs, both of which tend to exacerbate the problem of long hours.
Therefore, it is crucial that no employer who permits or suffers
work to be done on its behalf be exempt from OSHA’s reach.318
ever, the broad remedial nature of this legislation demonstrates a
clear congressional intent that the existence of an employment rela-
tionship, for purposes of section 11(c), is to be based upon eco-
nomic realities rather than upon common law doctrines and
concepts. See U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Rutherford Food Corpo-
ration v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
(b) For purposes of section 11(c), even an applicant for employment
could be considered an employee. See NLRB v. Lamar Creamery, 246
F. 2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957). Further, because section 11(c) speaks in
terms of any employee, it is also clear that the employee need not
be an employee of the discriminator. The principal consideration
would be whether the person alleging discrimination was an “em-
ployee” at the time of engaging in protected activity.
317 See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, OSHA, Multi-Employer Citation Policy, Effective Date:
Dec. 10, 1999, available at http:// www. osha.gov/ pls/ oshaweb/ owadisp. show_ doc-
ument? p_ table = DIRECTIVES &p_id =202 4#MULTI (explaining that only exposing
employers are citable for a general duty clause violation and define exposing employ-
ers as “an employer whose own employees are exposed to the hazard.”). The Directive
outlines the standard for determining a violation as follows:
If the exposing employer created the violation, it is citable for the viola-
tion as a creating employer. If the violation was created by another em-
ployer, the exposing employer is citable if it (1) knew of the hazardous
condition or failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover the con-
dition, and (2) failed to take steps consistent with its authority to pro-
tect its employees. If the exposing employer has authority to correct the
hazard, it must do so. If the exposing employer lacks the authority to
correct the hazard, it is citable if it fails to do each of the following: (1)
ask the creating and/or controlling employer to correct the hazard; (2)
inform its employees of the hazard; and (3) take reasonable alternative
protective measures. In extreme circumstances (e.g., imminent danger
situations), the exposing employer is citable for failing to remove its
employees from the job to avoid the hazard. Id.
318 Inclusion of all workers within OSHA’s mandate could be done either through
an expansive definition of employment under Silk and Rutherford or use of the joint
employer doctrine. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Mod-
ern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L.
Rev. 983, 984 (1999) (arguing that the “suffer or permit to work” definition of em-
ployment under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Agricultural Workers Protec-
tion Act is broader than the common law “to employ” definition of employment as
connoting direct control over employees because it includes allowing work to take
place or to acquiesce in work that is integrated into the employers’ production pro-
cess). Citing Silk and Rutherford for this broader definition, the authors contend that
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In addition, the burden should be on the employer to prove
that working more than fifty hours per week does not constitute a
workplace hazard. This figure is based on a cautious interpretation
of current research. Where the standard employer practice is to
mandate or permit over fifty hours of work per week by an em-
ployee, an inspector should make a rebuttable presumption that
such practice violates the general duty clause. Recognizing that the
question of who is an employer should be construed expansively,
an inspector should be given authority to cite any employer who
could have prevented the violation. This standard is broader than
standards limited to all employees within that employer’s exclusive
control or at that employer’s worksite.
As part of the Secretary’s authority to order abatement mea-
sures, an inspector should have the authority to order, and workers
the right to request the inspector to order, the employer to reduce
the number of hours worked to fifty for worker(s) at risk of likely
serious injury or death. Also, an inspector must have a reasonable
basis on which to order such action. Permissible evidence for the
inspector’s order could include interviews with employers and
workers, independent or company medical reports and evalua-
tions, prior successful use in a similar context, expert testimony,
and existing scientific research. Indeed, in determining what con-
stituted sufficient evidence of an abatement measure’s efficacy, Pep-
peridge Farm confirmed the following as sufficient: “use of a similar
approach elsewhere, industry standards and testimony by experts
in the industry, and expert testimony that the technology proposed
by the Secretary had been on the market for a number of years and
would materially reduce the hazard.”319
The authority to cap overtime for all affected workers places
appropriate controls on employers’ existing unilateral authority to
demand or permit excessive work hours. As discussed, this abate-
ment measure could be ordered even when the threshold level at
which the worker is placed in danger is unknown. This authority
could extend to all workers in a particular job category or at the
workplace as long as the number of work hours per week can be
to “suffer or permit to work” encompasses a wider range of forms of work arrange-
ments including that of the employer who subcontracts some portion of its work. Id.
For a discussion on the joint employer doctrine, see Lung, supra note 55 at 345, 352
(arguing for industry-specific standards under the joint employer doctrine and that
primary inquiry with regard to joint liability should focus on manufacturer control of
the contract and determinants of profit rather than factors such as exclusivity, perma-
nency, or regularity of ties between manufacturers and contractors).
319 Pepperidge Farm, 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA), at *169.
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established. Where overtime hours exceed twenty hours per week,
or a sixty-hour workweek, or where the employer cannot produce
work hours records, an inspector should be able unilaterally to im-
pose reductions in weekly work hours without substantiating medi-
cal evaluations based on affidavits from workers. The inspector’s
unilateral authority to cap work hours at a level not to exceed ten
hours of overtime per week should continue indefinitely until
health evaluations can be conducted on all relevant workers.
Moreover, since research indicates that workers are at in-
creased risk for certain illnesses such as cardiovascular disease
when workload demands and long hours are accompanied by hav-
ing no say over working conditions, inspectors should be given au-
thority to order hours reductions as well as other engineering or
administrative controls that address job strain.320 As discussed, a
broad interpretation of what constitutes mandatory overtime
should therefore be adopted to address situations where lack of
worker job control results from economic coercion (an implied
condition of employment as well as explicit demands to work those
hours). If an employer does not resolve the job strain problems,
the inspector should have the authority, and the worker the right
to file a claim, to order the employer to reduce hours to no more
than forty hours per week and demand changes in work processes
and work environment that promote increased decision-making
authority and influence over work performance for the worker(s)
in question. In designing an abatement process to change work
processes and the work environment, an inspector should be re-
quired to obtain input from workers and health and safety
advocates.
OSHA’s authority to prohibit excessive work hours should be
formulated in such a way as to address the interplay between pro-
ductivity and work hours to prevent employers from shifting be-
320 See Landsbergis, supra note 4, at 64. Landsbergis discusses how, rather than pro-
moting worker participation and autonomy, lean production, flexible work arrange-
ments, and the new labor supply regime have combined to create more job strain that
is work intensified with less job control. He goes on to explain that research indicates
that workers who have less job control suffer a greater risk of cardiovascular dis-
ease–one example of less job control is the inability to say no to working long hours.
One study found a two-fold increase in the risk of myocardial infarction when weekly
hours rose above sixty hours. Id. at 67. In describing how new work arrangements lead
to less job control, he writes, “[l]ow or decreasing decision authority was also reported
in many cases, including a decline in participation in decision-making, and ‘influence
over the job’ over time as new systems were implemented.” Id., at 64. He finds that
socioeconomic status (being blue-collar) also increases the adverse health effects
from job strain. Id.
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tween a work hours hazard to an ergonomics hazard.321 Therefore,
where an employer has been cited for excessive hours and thereaf-
ter imposes work speed-ups or break-reductions in order to com-
pensate for the lost work hours, the inspector should also have the
authority to order, and the worker the right to file claims for addi-
tional abatement measures that require the introduction of engi-
neering or administrative controls to prevent employers from
merely substituting an ergonomic hazard with the hazard of exces-
sive work hours.322 Such practices should be treated as willful viola-
tions and reach not only the particular worker or job position that
was initially cited but any worker in the workforce adversely af-
fected by the secondary violation. Inspectors could cite to existing
research indicating that reducing work hours did not reduce pro-
ductivity levels to counter employer claims that such speed-ups are
economically necessary or that reducing work hours is not econom-
ically feasible.323
Long work hours not only affect employees adversely but can
also have negative effects on a worker’s family. The Australian In-
dustrial Relations Commission’s policy of prohibiting excessive
overtime when it affects workers’ family responsibilities is com-
mendable.324 However, it is probably beyond the plausible scope of
the general duty clause to include family disruption or conflict
within the realm of serious injury caused by the recognized hazard
of long work hours. While health problems caused by overwork can
adversely impact other family members by causing them to work
additional hours to compensate for an injured wage earner in the
family or stirring up family conflicts such as divorce, courts would
likely see the connection between excessive hours and family life as
a quality of life issue that is too attenuated to satisfy the likely harm
321 This will certainly prove challenging since OSHA has demonstrated an inability
to enforce health and safety laws when it infringes upon employer productivity. See
Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken, supra note 58, at 34, 116 (noting that the USDA,
rather than OSHA, sets the line-speed of the disassembly line for the approximately
200,000 poultry processing production workers and detailing OSHA’s inability to slow
down production lines in the poultry processing industry which is leading cause of
injuries, thus illustrating the difficulty in enforcing health and safety regulations when
they interfere with productivity levels).
322 While opponents will argue that an OSHA mandate that includes the power to
reduce work hours to the point of affecting productivity levels gives inspectors and the
government too much say over the daily operations of private business, OSHA already
has the power to order engineering, administrative, and work practice controls to
adjust the PEL to numerous workplace hazards. I would argue that applying this
power to the area of overwork is crucial if workers are to have full protection.
323 Goldenhar et. al., supra note 4, at 223.
324 See King & Kemp, supra note 89, at 19.
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requirement. However, family disruption and conflict can and
should be used by OSHA inspectors as a symptom of excessive
hours in order to look for likely injuries.325
Since the threshold level at which long hours becomes hazard-
ous varies by industry, occupation, and a host of other workplace
and worker variables, research will always be inexact when it comes
to finding the point at which the greatest number of hours can be
worked while ensuring worker health and safety.326 Therefore, to
build greater consensus for OSHA’s expanded mandate and to pre-
vent obstructionist efforts calling for still more and more studies,
inspectors should focus primarily on two scenarios, situations
where excessive work hours, mandated or permitted by employers
(1) constitute a standard practice, or (2) represent employer coer-
cion manifesting as an explicit employer demand, an implied con-
dition of employment to become, remain, or advance in the job, or
as necessary in order to supplement low wages. Although one-time
instances that were sufficiently severe would not be exempt from
inspection or citation, targeting employers whose standard practice
has entailed coercing excessive hours from workers would more
suitably realize the prophylactic purpose of the Act while pursuing
the worst offenders.
Regulating long work hours is not conducive to a promulgated
standard because of the variation by industry and occupation. Ac-
cordingly, employer standard practices of mandating or permitting
excessive hours that rise to the level of a workplace hazard must be
determined by OSHA inspectors on a case-by-case basis, factoring
in the following: specific job duties; type of work; working condi-
tions during the overtime hours; presence of environmental stres-
sors such as toxic exposure; physical and psychological intensity of
the work performed, as well as the number of overtime hours
325 Goldenhar et al., supra note 4, at 223. The authors cite one study that found that
“reducing the amount of time people have for social and parenting activities can lead
to irritability, which can be detrimental both at home and on the job.” Id. (citation
omitted).
326 See Spurgeon et al., supra note 25, at 372 (noting that current evidence is “un-
doubtedly sufficient to raise concerns about a possible link between long hours and
the risk of significant health outcomes, including cardiovascular disease, particularly
when those hours exceed fifty hours a week.”). “[C]urrently available data are insuffi-
cient to determine exactly how many hours people should be required to work if they
are to remain safe and healthy.” Id. at 374. It is likely that as the threshold level at
which work hours becomes hazardous moves closer to forty hours per week, industry
challenges to regulation will intensify. These challenges will be targeted at the re-
search supporting a lower threshold level and, if that is unsuccessful, at the direct
impact on the ability to run businesses in a way that maximizes competitiveness and
profitability.
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worked by the employee. OSHA workplace inspectors should look
for signs that contribute to karoshi.327
Monetary penalties would obviously increase with the fre-
quency and severity of the violation. Moreover, the Act’s threat of
imprisonment against willful and repeat violators when the viola-
tion results in an employee’s death (which has been largely ig-
nored) should be used as leverage where appropriate and
relevant.328 OSHA inspectors should coordinate their inspections
with state workers’ compensation systems so that compliant em-
ployers’ workers’ compensation premiums reflect that compliance
where the reduction in claims can be linked to transparent em-
ployer health and safety policies.329 OSHA inspectors should be au-
thorized to order health evaluations of employees (at the
employer’s expense) who file claims of injuries or illnesses due to
excessive work hours. In the case of an actual injury or illness, the
OSHA inspectors, like their Japanese examiner counterparts,
should also be authorized to investigate as little as one week and up
to six months (and possibly longer) prior to the worker’s death or
injury to determine whether excessive work hours was a factor in
the incident.
Though anti-retaliation and right-to-refuse provisions may be
inadequate protections by themselves, ensuring that workers could
avail themselves of these protections would further safeguard their
right to be free from the recognized hazard of excessive work
hours. Workers’ existing rights under the Act (including the right
327 See supra Part II.B (discussing the contributory factors to karoshi and the AHA
study finding that these same factors cause heart disease).
328 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (2002). See also Gross, supra note 27, at 362-63 (criticizing the
timidity of the provision, which only contemplates imprisonment for violations that
cause death, and remarking “[t]he value judgments underlying that provision should
be obvious. Ralph Nader has pointed out, for example, that another federal law pro-
vides for one year in jail for “maliciously harassing [not killing] a wild ass.” (internal
parentheses omitted)).
329 See Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken, supra note 58, at 119. In discussing
Perdue’s decision to implement an ergonomics program, Linder reports that, “[t]he
firm’s safety and health director has stated that Perdue has been able to finance the
costs of the program through reduced costs incurred in workers’ compensation
claims, which amounted to 70%; reduced turnover and enhanced productivity of
healthier employees represent additional savings.” Linder goes on to note that,
“[o]ne reason why firms may not be impelled to reduce their workers’ compensation
costs is that they may have intimidated workers . . . so that their fear of reprisal and
loss of income induces them not to file or pursue claims. Far from striving to elimi-
nate the conditions that cause repetitive trauma syndrome, some firms appear to fo-
cus on frustrating employees’ efforts even to secure workers’ compensation benefits
for injuries already sustained.”
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to request330 and accompany an OSHA inspector’s inspection of
the workplace, access to employer health and safety reports and
records, protection against retaliation and the right to refuse to
work under hazardous conditions) should all extend to the area of
excessive hours. While employers should be required to monitor
and maintain reports on the health and safety effects of work
hours, workers should also have the right to request a medical eval-
uation wherever there is a reasonable basis for their claim. In addi-
tion, employees should be given the right to access employer
records of work hours which inspectors should be required to re-
view. Where such records do not exist or there are indications of
falsification, inspectors should have authority to issue a citation
based on the testimony of workers themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
An OSHA mandate that would prohibit excessive work hours
represents one concrete way to place the problem of overwork on
the national agenda. The primary objective of identifying work
hours as a health and safety concern is to shift public consciousness
in the direction of calling for a regulatory scheme that puts an end
to employers’ unilateral authority to set hours. Such power not
only creates a downward pressure on wages, but it deprives workers
of their health and safety. OSHA is the most appropriate agency to
prevent employers from using overtime as a form of hazard pay
that boosts productivity and profit on the backs of workers. No
longer would workers be forced to choose between their health
and job by assuming the costs of employer-created working condi-
tions at the expense of their lives and health. While in theory haz-
ard pay presumes that workers bargain for higher wages based on
the hazardous condition, in the case of long hours, workers have
lost any bargaining power they may once have had to refuse such
conditions. Expanding OSHA’s mandate to include prohibiting ex-
cessive work hours takes away the employers’ unilateral authority to
set such work hours and gives working people a new way to fight
for control over their lives.
Based on the legislative history and relevant precedent, it is
reasonable to conclude that long work hours are a recognized haz-
ard within the scope of the general duty clause. To be sure, the
threshold level at which long work hours becomes hazardous will
330 Courts have held that “an employee complaint may allege violations of the gen-
eral duty clause when OSHA has not yet promulgated a specific standard addressing
the complained of harm.” See Reich v. Kelly-Springfield, 13 F.3d 1160, 1167 (1994).
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vary by industry, occupation, and a host of environmental stressors.
Nonetheless, research indicates that working long hours, standing
alone, is hazardous and that it exacerbates existing hazards such as
ergonomic hazards and toxic exposures. Even if excessive work
hours are deemed solely a contributory factor, safety experts and
OSHA inspectors could recommend reducing work hours as a fea-
sible abatement measure. Research supports setting a general
threshold level of fifty hours after which a rebuttable presumption
is made by OSHA that work hours become hazardous. There is still
a great need for OSHA, NIOSH, and the academic and legal com-
munity to provide more comprehensive research that can assist
workers, inspectors, employers, and courts in determining safe
levels of work in particular industries and occupations and, in par-
ticular, how the hazard will manifest depending upon the specific
work being performed. However, the fact that more research
across occupation and industry is needed to identify specific indus-
try, occupation, and co-mixed threshold levels should not be used
to undermine attempts to prohibit excessive work hours to protect
worker health and safety.
With regard to including so-called voluntary overtime within
this mandate, in passing the Act, Congress recognized the danger
for employees who may be economically coerced into self-exposure
to earn a livelihood. In today’s lean economy in which working
people have become conditioned to accept overwork, much of
what is deemed voluntary overtime is in fact compulsory and there-
fore so-called voluntary overtime must be included within any
OSHA actions to prohibit excessive work hours. This will prevent
employers from using low wages to economically coerce workers
into long hours. However, using the general duty clause as pro-
posed in this article would only limit the work hours of those work-
ers whose health and safety are at risk. Therefore, OSHA’s
monitoring and enforcement presence in this area would not cate-
gorically prohibit all work hours over the fifty-hour workweek
threshold. As stated, OSHA’s mandate should focus on the worst
offenders, identified above as instances in which long hours is a
standard practice based on some form of coercion. Moreover, con-
cerns that limiting the work hours and therefore the wages of low-
income workers is at cross-purposes with this group’s own eco-
nomic interests disregard the fact that a living wage does not guar-
antee a safe level of work hours and that widespread use of
overtime creates a downward pressure on wages. Such concerns
also prioritize wage remuneration of workers over worker health
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and fail to acknowledge that paying workers overtime can actually
be cheaper than paying for the direct costs of work-related injuries
and illnesses.
In sum, the epidemic of overwork characterized by a long
work hours crisis must be properly framed as one emerging from
the lack of control working people have over their work, health,
and lives. Since there is growing awareness of the crisis of long
hours, legal practitioners and occupational health and safety advo-
cates should begin to develop a strategy to push the law in the di-
rection of holding OSHA accountable to its mandate to protect
worker health and safety as well as employers for the work arrange-
ments that are depriving working people of their health. As an em-
ployer-created hazard that operates directly upon workers and
which can cause serious injury or death, long work hours must be
understood as one of the greatest threats to worker health and
safety. Presently, OSHA does not appear willing to expand its man-
date to prohibit excessive work hours. Movement on this issue re-
quires a paradigm shift in the national discourse that must be led
by working people to push health and safety experts, employers,
and various legislatures to recognize the urgency of this issue. A
movement for shorter work hours then must be understood as
more than simply a call to spread work or enhance working peo-
ple’s quality of life, but as the means by which working people can
take control of their time, health, and lives and as the condition
precedent to worker health and safety.
